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This paper introduces an index that comprehensively measures the complexity of coun-
tries’ corporate income tax systems faced by multinational corporations. It builds on 
surveys of highly experienced tax consultants of the largest international tax services 
networks. The index, called Tax Complexity Index (TCI), is composed of a tax code 
subindex covering tax regulations and a tax framework subindex covering tax pro-
cesses and features. For a sample of 100 countries, we find that the level of tax com-
plexity varies considerably across countries, while tax code and framework complexity 
also vary within countries. Overall, tax complexity is strongly driven by the complexity 
of transfer pricing regulations in the tax code and tax audits in the tax framework. 
When analyzing the associations with other country characteristics, we identify differ-
ent patterns. For example, tax framework complexity is negatively associated with 
countries’ governance, suggesting that strongly governed countries tend to have less 
complex tax frameworks, while tax code complexity is positively associated with the 
statutory tax rate, indicating that high-tax countries tend to have more complex tax 
codes. However, none of the observed associations are very strong. We conclude that 
tax complexity represents a distinct characteristic and propose our (sub)indices be used 
in future research. 
Keywords: business taxation, cross-country survey, multinational corporations, tax 
complexity, tax consultants, tax index 
JEL Classification: H20, H25, C83, O57
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1. Introduction 
This paper introduces a survey-based index that captures the complexity of corporate income 
tax systems and thereby provides a comprehensive measure to assess the tax complexity faced 
by multinational corporations across a large number of countries. 
Recent evidence indicates that tax complexity has increased significantly in the past years 
(Devereux, 2016; Hoppe et al., 2017). This increase can be attributed to at least two factors. 
The first is the introduction and adaption of tax measures to ensure a level playing field for 
firms and to close tax loopholes, leading to extraordinary costs and uncertainty. The second is 
the implementation of tax incentives and mechanisms to attract investments and to resolve 
uncertainties, thereby lowering costs and providing opportunities for tax planning. As indicated 
by the latter, tax complexity is not bad per se. Nonetheless, concerns have emerged that tax 
systems have become too complex (Ingraham & Karlinsky, 2005, United States; Tran-Nam & 
Karlinsky, 2008, Australia; Spengel et al., 2012, Germany; Deloitte, 2014, China; Whiting et 
al., 2014, UK) and that the negative consequences of tax complexity may dominate the positive 
consequences (Müller & Voget, 2012).1 In particular, tax complexity is expected to jeopardize 
economic prosperity (Collier et al., 2018) and to encourage undesired tax planning or tax avoid-
ance (Budak & James, 2018). The negative impact of tax complexity is also addressed by the 
tax certainty reports of the IMF and the OECD (IMF & OECD, 2017, 2018, 2019), which 
conclude that more clarity and less complexity are needed to support economic growth. 
Given that a uniform definition of tax complexity is missing, a variety of studies have addressed 
it differently. While past studies have often focused on one facet of tax complexity (e.g., Clot-
felter, 1983; Slemrod & Blumenthal, 1996), such as the level of detail in tax regulations, more 
recent studies have started to account for the multidimensional nature of the topic by evaluating 
 
1
  As indicated by theoretical and experimental studies, tax complexity can discourage investments (Boylan & 
Frischmann, 2006; Niemann, 2011) and trigger noncompliance (Milliron, 1985; Beck et al., 1991).  
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different facets simultaneously (e.g., Slemrod, 2005; Tran-Nam & Evans, 2014; OTS, 2015). 
However, as more facets are addressed in the extant literature fewer countries are considered. 
Given that tax complexity is a worldwide phenomenon, several calls have been issued for more 
international comparative approaches (McKerchar, 2005; OTS, 2015). In this paper, we re-
spond to these calls and create a Tax Complexity Index (TCI), a country-level measure of the 
corporate income tax complexity faced by multinational corporations (MNCs).2 With the TCI 
and its underlying data, we aim to answer the following questions: 
(1) How does tax complexity vary across countries? 
(2) What are the main drivers of tax complexity? 
(3) Is tax complexity associated with other country characteristics? 
In answering these questions, the aim of this paper is to provide a better and more detailed 
understanding of tax complexity.3 In the development of the index, we follow a two-step form-
ative measurement approach based on the theoretical consideration that the latent construct, tax 
complexity, is a composite of different dimensions. In the first step, the construct and its di-
mensions were identified via a thorough literature review, conversations with tax experts and 
a global online survey of highly experienced tax consultants (first survey; Hoppe et al., 2018). 
In this prior work, we found that tax complexity consists of two subconstructs: tax code com-
plexity (the complexity that arises from the regulations of the tax code4) and tax framework 
complexity (the complexity that arises from the legislative and administrative processes and 
features within a tax system), each of which is made up of several dimensions. Based on this 
result, we operationalized our TCI with two subindices that cover these two subconstructs. In 
 
2
  Index construction has also been widely applied in other research areas such as corporate disclosure (Raffour-
nier, 1995; Chavent et al., 2006; Athanasakou et al., 2020), corporate governance (García Lara et al., 2007) or 
the attractiveness of tax systems (Simmons, 2003; Schanz et al., 2017b). 
3
  We do not address any questions on the optimal level of tax complexity or on the distinction between necessary 
and unnecessary complexity. 
4
  We use the term “regulation” to cover rules or standards in the tax code. Other (legal) meanings (e.g., guide-
lines) are not covered by this definition. 
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the second step, another online survey was distributed via 19 international tax services firms 
and networks to their highly experienced tax consultants to gather country-level tax complexity 
data for the year 2016 (second survey). In total, we obtained 933 responses that enabled us to 
measure and assess tax complexity for 100 countries worldwide. 
Based on these responses, we find that the overall level of tax complexity varies considerably 
across countries. There are countries that present both highly or less complex tax codes and 
frameworks. However, we also observe several countries in which tax code and tax framework 
complexity differ to a large extent. In particular, countries, such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Germany, whose tax systems are often considered the most complex, have a 
medium overall level of complexity that comprises a high level of tax code complexity and a 
low level of tax framework complexity. From a global perspective, tax complexity is strongly 
affected by the complexity of transfer pricing regulations in the tax code and by the complexity 
of tax audits in the tax framework. The main drivers of the complexity of transfer pricing reg-
ulations are documentation requirements (record keeping) and the ambiguity (ambiguity and 
interpretation) of these regulations. In contrast, tax audit complexity is strongly driven by long 
statutes of limitations and inconsistent decisions by tax officers. An analysis of the associations 
between our tax complexity measures and economic, political/legal and tax country character-
istics shows different correlation patterns. For example, triggered by the negative association 
between tax framework complexity and governance, a negative association occurs between tax 
complexity and the governance of a country. Hence, strongly governed countries tend to have 
less complex tax frameworks. In contrast, triggered by tax code complexity, a positive associ-
ation occurs between tax complexity and the statutory tax rate: this indicates that high tax 
countries tend to have more complex tax codes. However, none of the associations are very 
strong. This finding supports the view that tax complexity represents a distinct country charac-
teristic. 
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This paper makes several contributions to extant literature. We examine corporate income tax 
complexity worldwide and thereby provide a deeper understanding of this important tax system 
characteristic. We extend prior research on the measurement of tax complexity by introducing 
the first comprehensive cross-country tax complexity index. Compared to previous measures, 
our index has several advantages. First, it explicitly focuses on the measurement of tax com-
plexity, building on a uniform, well-grounded and transparent approach. Second, it is broader 
as it captures tax complexity faced by MNCs in general and not, for example, by a specific 
company. Third, it is based on both facts and perceptions obtained by highly experienced tax 
professionals. Fourth, it can be decomposed into its components, allowing to study different 
facets of tax complexity (e.g., tax code and tax framework complexity).5 With the index and 
its underlying components, we pave the way for future research, ranging from single-country 
to cross-country archival studies, to investigate the effects of tax complexity on a variety of 
corporate decisions, such as investment or profit shifting.6 Hence, we provide new opportuni-
ties for research on the impact of tax system characteristics (Atwood et al., 2012; Markle, 2016; 
Blouin et al., 2018). In terms of practical implications, the index and its components can help 
policy makers and governments to benchmark their country’s tax complexity against that of 
other countries and to identify aspects that require further consideration. Finally, tax practition-
ers can use the index and its components as a source of information to gain an impression of 
countries’ tax complexity. Moreover, they can use it as a guide to make decisions or to advise 
clients on matters that are related to tax complexity. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of prior measurement ap-
proaches and briefly discusses their meaning and limitations. Section 3 introduces the method-
ology for the index construction. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics on the TCI and its 
 
5
  The index and its main components are available for download at www.taxcomplexity.org. 
6
  The use of different components of the TCI can help to address questions on whether tax complexity is always 
positive or negative or whether it depends on the form of complexity. 
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components. Subsequently, Section 5 compares the TCI and its subindices with other country 
characteristics. Section 6 assesses the robustness of our results. The last section presents a sum-
mary and the conclusions. 
2. Review of existing measurement approaches 
In the literature, the term tax complexity is defined in different ways.7 Because of these differ-
ent definitions, a variety of methods for measuring tax complexity have emerged. They build 
on measuring the costs, characteristics, or perceptions of tax complexity. To provide a system-
atic overview of the approaches that have been used or proposed in the literature, we categorize 
them based on two criteria: (1) the number of facets of tax complexity and (2) the number of 
countries considered. 
The most common approach is to focus on one facet of tax complexity and to measure it for 
one country. We place studies using this approach into a category we call one facet–one coun-
try. Among the well-known studies in this category are those that analyze the costs of taxation, 
such as Sandford (1989), Pope and Fayle (1991) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) and 
Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996).8 The most common types of costs are tax compliance costs, 
followed by tax administrative and tax planning costs. Because such costs are usually not dis-
closed, cost studies often gather information through surveys. However, survey-based cost 
measurement is characterized by several issues, including framing effects.9 These issues are 
not present when tax complexity is measured by the characteristics of a tax system. Common 
characteristics that are examined include the level of detail and the understandability of the tax 
code or related documents. While details are usually measured by counting the number of reg-
ulations, paragraphs or words (Karlinsky, 1981; Clotfelter, 1983; Weinstein, 2014; Weber, 
 
7
  See Slemrod (1989), McCaffery (1990), Cooper (1993), Evans and Tran-Nam (2010), Tran-Nam and Evans 
(2014), Diller et al. (2013) or Hoppe et al. (2018). 
8
  A literature review on the measurement of tax (bureaucracy) costs is provided by Eichfelder (2011). 
9
  See Eichfelder and Vaillancourt (2014) or Eichfelder and Hechtner (2018). 
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2015), understandability is regularly determined through readability indices (Tan & Tower, 
1992; Richardson & Sawyer, 1998; Pau et al., 2007; Saw & Sawyer 2010). A serious drawback 
of these purely fact-based methods is that they often rely on strong assumptions and do not 
consider how certain facts are actually perceived by taxpayers.10 This issue is addressed by 
survey studies that measure tax complexity based on the perceptions of individuals, companies 
or tax professionals (Tran-Nam & Karlinsky, 2010; Gupta 2011). However, most studies focus 
on the overall complexity level of the tax code or single tax regulations and do not provide 
deeper insights. 
Rather than focusing on one specific facet of tax complexity, another approach is to look at 
two or more selected facets in one country. We name this category few facets–one country.11 
The studies that are assigned to this category either extend or combine the methods described 
above. For example, Koch and Karlinsky (1984) and Martindale et al. (1992) develop an ex-
tended readability measure, while Moody et al. (2005) examine not only compliance costs but 
also the number of words and sections of the U.S. tax code. Slemrod (2005) and Bacher and 
Brülhart (2013) extend prior count-based studies by using two measures instead of one. With 
regard to the perception-based studies, Long and Swingen (1987), Carnes and Cuccia (1996) 
and Lassila and Smith (1997) take into account the perception of tax complexity sources or 
costs in addition to the perception of regulations. 
More recently, tax complexity has been considered a multidimensional concept and has been 
measured based on a variety of facets in one country. Accordingly, studies using this approach 
are assigned to a category we call many facets–one country. This category is strongly influ-
enced by initiatives that governments and other organizations take in their efforts to simplify 
 
10
  When using the number of words in the tax code, a higher number usually indicates a more complex code. 
However, in practice, it could also mean that the tax code provides more information with which to understand 
a tax treatment, thus indicating a less complex tax code. 
11
  In terms of facets, few is defined as more than one but fewer than ten, while many is defined as ten or more. 
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the tax system. One of the first studies in this category was conducted by the Office of Tax 
Simplification (OTS), which developed a complexity index for the United Kingdom (OTS, 
2012, 2015, 2017). The index covers the underlying complexity and the impact of complexity. 
A similar index has been proposed but not applied in Australia by Tran-Nam and Evans (2014). 
Using a survey, Borrego et al. (2016) construct three indices based on several facets of com-
plexity. 
All the studies above focus on a specific country, which makes it difficult to generalize and 
compare their results. Another approach is therefore to measure tax complexity across coun-
tries. Existing studies that examine tax complexity across countries show that in a cross-country 
setting, several problems arise, e.g., issues due to the lack of comparable data. However, some 
studies have employed this approach. We place these studies in one of the two categories we 
call one facet–few countries or few facets–few countries.12 Examples of the first category are 
the studies of McKerchar et al. (2005), Richardson (2006a, b), Ehrlich (2011) and Freudenberg 
et al. (2012), which either use a count- or perception-based approach to compare one facet of 
complexity across a few countries. Studies by the OECD (2001), Edmiston et al. (2003) and 
Budak and James (2016), which can be assigned to the second category, extend this stream of 
literature by considering more than one facet of complexity for a few countries. For example, 
Budak and James (2016) use a rather comprehensive tax complexity measure in their study by 
applying a modified version of the OTS index to four countries. However, they conclude that 
the index is not suitable for an international comparison. 
To date, studies that consider many countries are rare. Only three studies can be categorized as 
few facets–many countries, namely, Peter et al. (2010), the annual Paying Taxes study of PwC 
et al. and the study by the TMF Group (2017, 2018). While Peter et al. (2010) focus on tax 
 
12
  In terms of countries, few is defined as more than one but fewer than 50, while many is defined as 50 or more. 
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complexity based on six count-based facets and faced by personal taxpayers in 189 countries, 
based on seven facets, PwC et al. (2017) examine the overall costs and administrative tax bur-
den of a standardized domestic company without any foreign operations in 190 countries, re-
sulting in an overall Paying Taxes measure and some sub-components. Although the study of 
PwC et al. (2017) does not intend to measure tax complexity, the few empirical studies that 
analyze the effects of tax complexity across countries, such as Müller and Voget (2012), Law-
less (2013) and Liu and Feng (2015), usually rely on the Paying Taxes measure. Data for the 
Paying Taxes measure are gathered through a survey of tax experts from different firms (in-
cluding PwC). The study by the TMF Group (2017, 2018) aims to establish a country ranking 
with regard to financial complexity, including taxation. Similar to the study of PwC et al. 
(2017), an (in-house) survey of accounting and tax experts is used to obtain the data to deter-
mine the ranking. However, neither TMF Group (2017, 2018) nor PwC et al. (2017) provide 
information about the number of experts and their characteristics. 
Although tax complexity is increasing and becoming more and more important, there is, as 
indicated above, no appropriate measure of tax complexity. This also becomes apparent when 
looking at the literature criticizing both the quality and the usefulness of the Paying Taxes 
measure as an indicator of total complexity (Tran-Nam & Evans 2014). Several calls have been 
issued for more international comparable, comprehensive measures of tax complexity (McKer-
char 2005; OTS 2015). The lack of such measures might also explain why empirical studies on 
the effects of tax complexity are still rare. 
We contribute to the literature on the measurement of tax complexity by developing a meas-
urement approach that captures the multidimensional nature of tax complexity faced by MNCs 
for a large number of countries. Thus, we provide the first study in the category called many 
facets–many countries. To overcome the limitations of prior literature, we build on a concep-
tual framework and gather information on tax complexity by surveying experienced tax 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469663
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consultants on both the facts and on their perceptions of various facets of tax complexity (e.g., 
perceived problems).13 Facts and perceptions provide valuable complementary information. 
While facts give information about de jure regulations and processes, perceptions indicate how 
they are implemented or put into practice.14 As indicated by prior literature, professionals’ per-
ceptions appear particularly important and should therefore not be neglected when measuring 
tax complexity.15 We also adopt an input-oriented (i.e., formative) perspective, which enables 
us to examine the underlying drivers of tax complexity. With our new approach, we support 
future research in conducting cross-country analyses and thus in shedding light on the effects 
of tax complexity on certain factors, such as firm behavior. 
3. Development of the Tax Complexity Index 
General approach 
We focus on the corporate income tax system complexity faced by MNCs. To capture the var-
ious facets of corporate income tax complexity, based on a formative approach according to 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001), we construct a tax complexity index using a four-step 
process. First, the domain of the content the index is intended to capture has to be specified 
(content specification). Second, the indicators (complexity drivers) that cover the entire scope 
of the latent variable (tax complexity) must be gathered (indicator specification). Third, the 
issue of multicollinearity among the variables must be addressed (collinearity). Fourth, the as-
sociation between the index and other related variables has to be assessed (external validity). 
 
13
  We also included questions on facts in the survey as it allowed us to obtain data on these facts on a comparable 
basis for a large number of countries which would have not been possible otherwise. 
14
  For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of fact-based and perception-based measures, see Ni-
coletti and Pryor (2006). 
15
  Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in case of tax-related decisions concerning another country, tax consultants 
of this country are usually contacted and asked for their opinion. Hence, when obtaining information on tax 
complexity, the opinions of tax consultants also need to be included.  
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Content and indicator specification 
The literature does not provide a uniform definition of tax complexity. In prior work, we there-
fore developed our own definition and identified the drivers of tax complexity. Based on in-
tensive literature reviews and conversations with tax experts, we created a first online survey 
that was distributed via two tax services networks to their tax consultants.16 In this survey, we 
asked respondents to indicate important complexity drivers and corporate income tax regula-
tions for MNCs. We received 221 surveys completed by highly experienced tax consultants 
from 108 countries.17 The results, which are described in detail in Hoppe et al. (2018), show 
that tax complexity is a much broader construct than indicated in prior literature. We find that 
tax complexity is a feature of the tax system that arises from the difficulty of reading, under-
standing and complying with the tax code as well as from issues of various kinds within the 
tax framework. Hence, we understand tax complexity as being characterized through two sub-
constructs, namely, tax code and tax framework complexity, each of which covers various di-
mensions.  
Tax code complexity describes the complexity that is inherent in the different regulations of 
the tax code. Based on the first survey, we identified 15 regulations that cover a major part of 
the tax code and that are suitable for an international comparison: (A1) additional local and 
industry-specific income taxes, (A2) (alternative) minimum tax, (A3) capital gains and losses, 
(A4) controlled foreign corporations, (A5) corporate reorganization, (A6) depreciation and 
amortization, (A7) dividends including withholding taxes, (A8) general anti-avoidance, (A9) 
group treatment, (A10) interest including withholding taxes and thin capitalization, (A11) 
 
16
  To avoid responses that are highly firm-specific, we did not survey MNCs directly. Tax consultants are in-
volved in various tax matters and therefore possess the capability to answer the questions from a broader 
perspective. See Hoppe et al. (2018), p. 657. 
17
  The majority of the respondents consisted of partners, directors or principals (62.9 percent), had tax experience 
of more than 15 years (55.2 percent) and spent, on average, 68.0 percent of their total working time on MNC 
tax issues. See Hoppe et al. (2018), p. 660.  
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investment incentives, (A12) loss offset, (A13) royalties including withholding taxes, (A14) 
statutory corporate income tax rate, and (A15) transfer pricing. In our terminology, each regu-
lation represents a dimension of the tax code. To determine the degree of complexity of these 
dimensions, we identified five complexity drivers on which each dimension had to be evaluated 
(ambiguity & interpretation, change, computation, detail and record keeping).18 
Tax framework complexity describes the complexity that arises from the legislative and ad-
ministrative processes and features within a tax system. Based on our first survey, we identified 
five dimensions of the tax framework: (B1) tax guidance (i.e., guidance provided by the tax 
authority or by any law to clarify uncertain tax treatments or procedures), (B2) tax law enact-
ment (i.e., the process of how a tax regulation is enacted, starting with the discussion of a 
change in the tax law and ending with the regulation becoming effective), (B3) tax filing and 
payments (i.e., the process of preparing and filing tax returns as well as the payment and refund 
of taxes), (B4) tax audits (i.e., examination of the tax returns by the tax authority and extent to 
which they can be anticipated and prepared), and (B5) tax appeals (i.e., the process from filing 
an appeal with the responsible institution to its resolution at the administrative or judicial ap-
peal level).19 Compared with the dimensions of the tax code, these dimensions had to be eval-
uated based on several different complexity drivers that are specific to each dimension. We 
derived these drivers from a qualitative analysis of the first survey and a comprehensive liter-
ature review.20 To summarize, Figure 1 provides an overview of our concept of tax complexity, 
representing the basis of the tax complexity index. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
18
  See Appendix 1, panel A for a description of the tax code complexity drivers. 
19
  See Hoppe et al. (2018) for the identification of the dimensions of the tax framework. 
20
  See Appendix 1, panel B for a description of the tax framework complexity drivers. 
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Gathering data on tax complexity 
To collect the data to construct the complexity index for each country, we conducted a second 
online survey of tax consultants. We implemented the survey draft in Qualtrics and carried out 
comprehensive pretests.21 The final survey consisted of four parts and 52 standardized ques-
tions. In the first part, we asked respondents to specify the country with whose tax system they 
are most familiar and whether corporate income taxes are levied on resident corporations in 
that country. Furthermore, to gain familiarity with the topic, the respondents were given a 
warm-up exercise in which they had to evaluate three statements on the impact of tax complex-
ity in their country. In the second part of the survey, we explored the dimensions of the tax 
code. In the third part, we focused on the dimensions of the tax framework. In the last part, we 
gathered demographic information on the respondents.22 Throughout the survey, we added def-
initions and hints to several questions to ensure a uniform understanding and to provide re-
spondents with reference points for their judgments.23 
Before the participants were asked to answer any questions, they had to read a short introduc-
tion. They also received some general and content-related instructions. Whenever reasonable, 
we randomized the order of the questions in the survey. Except for a few questions, e.g., on the 
 
21
  We circulated the draft among 14 national and international tax experts (academics and practitioners) who 
were asked to complete the survey. After submitting their responses, they had to answer several questions on 
the content of the survey and its design. Based on their remarks, we made some minor revisions by rewriting 
several questions and response options to make them more precise. 
22
  For several reasons, we placed the demographic questions at the end of survey. First, demographic questions 
are not very interesting for respondents. If respondents take the survey because of an interest in the topic and 
have to start with demographic questions, they are more likely to quit the survey (Porst, 2014). Second, demo-
graphic questions do not require strong cognitive skills (Häder, 2015). As our survey is relatively long, re-
spondents could become tired by the end. Thus, rather than putting important topic-related questions at the 
end, we decided to round off the survey with the easy demographic questions. Third, by the end of the survey, 
respondents are aware of the survey content. As our survey does not contain any sensitive questions, respond-
ents are expected to be more likely to provide answers to the demographic questions at the end. However, the 
placement at the end of the survey does not enable us to analyze the demographic characteristics of the partic-
ipants who did not finish the survey. 
23
  For instance, we defined each dimension of the tax code. We defined transfer pricing regulations as regulations 
to prevent prices from being charged to a subsidiary or other related party in order to excessively reduce 
taxable income. In addition, we provided hints in the form of questions to sharpen the respondent’s view of 
this regulation: Does the tax code contain specific regulations on this? If not, do general concepts (e.g., arm’s 
length principle) apply? Does the tax code prescribe specific transfer pricing methods? […]. See Appendix 1 
for further examples. 
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country for which the responses were to be given, we refrained from using questions with 
forced responses. However, this approach led to some missing responses that we imputed by 
using median imputation at the country level.24 To be included in the dataset, the surveys had 
to be completed. 
We contacted major international tax services networks and asked them to distribute our survey 
to randomly selected tax consultants. To ensure the validity of the data for the analysis, the 
selection criteria for the consultants included an adequate degree of experience in the tax field 
as well as with MNCs. We sent out an email invitation with the survey link to our contacts in 
19 networks on October 19, 2016.25 These contacts circulated the invitation to at least 5,800 
consultants around the world.26 Reminders were sent out after three and five weeks. We re-
ceived a total of 1,016 useable responses from 147 countries by December 16, 2016, yielding 
a maximum response rate of 17.5 percent. For the purpose of the analysis, we only focus on 
responses from countries that levy corporate income taxes, which results in a total of 1,000 
responses from 143 countries. 
To check the quality of the responses, we perform two tests. First, we search for respondents 
who spent a very small amount of time on the survey (less than or equal to five minutes).27 
Based on this analysis, we drop all six responses from Jordan and thus exclude this country 
 
24
  An analysis of missing values showed that values are not systematically missing but rather missing completely 
at random. The missing ratio in the dataset of completed surveys was approximately 0.47 percent. Thus, only 
a very small number of values have been imputed.  
25
  These networks include Baker Tilly Roelfs, BDO, Crowe Kleeberg, Deloitte, DFK, Ecovis, HLB Stückmann, 
KPMG, Kreston, Moore Stephens, Nexia, PKF, PwC, RSM, Rödl & Partner, Taxand, UHY, Warth & Klein 
Grant Thornton and WTS. 
26
  The participating networks informed us about their distribution method and the approximate number of people 
who received the invitation. However, as several networks used existing global distribution lists and asked the 
recipients to further circulate the survey link within their country, the number of 5,800 consultants represents 
a lower bound of the potential participants. As we assured anonymity to the respondents, we are not able to 
identify the network to which the respondents belong. 
27
  We consider a duration of more than five minutes as realistic because survey participants could have printed 
out the survey to work on it offline and transferred them later to the online survey. 
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from the dataset.28 Second, we check the dataset for inexperienced tax consultants and examine 
whether their answers are systematically different from the answers of the other respondents 
from the respective country.29 One respondent from Madagascar is dropped based on this cri-
terion, which leaves us with 993 responses from 142 countries. 
To address the concern that single opinions dictate the level of tax complexity in a specific 
country, we exclude all countries from the analysis from which we only received one or two 
responses.30 This approach results in a remaining sample of 933 responses from 100 coun-
tries.31 Table 1 displays the distribution of the responses. 
[Table 1 near here] 
Table 2 provides the demographic information on the respondents, who are very similar in 
terms of position, specialization and education.32 Partners, directors and principals are the larg-
est group (64.4 percent), followed by managers (22.7 percent). The respondents generally have 
substantial experience in tax practice: 73.0 percent have been working in the tax field for more 
than 10 years, including 55.0 percent that report more than 15 years of tax experience. Almost 
90 percent specialize in income taxes, which represent the targeted type of taxes in this study. 
Furthermore, over 50 percent are familiar with more than one tax system. The respondents also 
have major experience with MNCs. On average, on MNC tax issues, the respondents spend 
54.1 percent of their total working time, of which 40.8 percent is devoted to purely international 
 
28
  Although only one out of six respondents from Jordan spent such a small amount of time on the survey, we 
also cross-checked the other respondents from this country. Most of them had a similar completion time of 
approximately 10 minutes. Furthermore, all respondents had very little experience with MNCs (around 5 per-
cent of their total working time). In the spirit of a cautious approach, we decided not to rely on the answers 
from Jordan. 
29
  For this purpose, we searched for respondents who are not specialized in income taxes, have less than five 
years of experience in the tax area, are under 30 years old and have classified themselves as junior assistants.  
30
  However, even in the remaining countries, the opinions vary across consultants to some extent: this is not bad 
per se, as people might come from different regions or have had different experiences. 
31
  Out of these 100 countries, 78 countries were also included in the sample of the first survey. This suggests that 
the first survey provides a reliable foundation for the second survey. 
32
  Demographic characteristics have not been imputed. Hence, missing values can occur. 
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tax issues. Moreover, the respondents have advanced education (majority with a master’s or 
doctoral degree). The extent of experience is also reflected by the age. More than half of the 
respondents (62.1 percent) are older than 40 years of age. In terms of gender, 71.1 percent are 
male, and 28.5 percent are female. In general, the characteristics of the respondents indicate 
that the sample consists of highly experienced tax consultants. The time they spent on the sur-
vey (approximately 39 minutes on average) corresponds to our prediction from the pretest. We 
therefore expect valid and reliable responses. 
[Table 2 near here] 
Index construction 
To construct the subindices and the index, we had to aggregate the data.33 With regard to tax 
code complexity, we asked the respondents to provide an importance rating for each dimension 
and complexity driver. The ratings indicate that the 15 dimensions and five complexity drivers 
of the tax code are not of equal relevance for MNCs. Thus, we applied weights based on the 
global importance rating of each dimension and complexity driver obtained through a 5-point 
Likert scale.34 The resulting weighting factors for the dimensions range from 0.025 (lowest 
weighting factor) to 0.085 (highest weighting factor), while those for the complexity drivers 
vary between 0.175 (lowest weighting factor) and 0.230 (highest weighting factor).35 The ap-
proach for constructing the tax code complexity subindex is expressed in the following for-
mula: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗 × 𝑑𝑗15𝑗=1   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   𝑑𝑗 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖  × 𝑥𝑖,𝑗5𝑖=1  (1) 
  
 
33
  According to the formative measurement approach, the weights of the indicators and the dimensions are usu-
ally obtained through a multivariate statistical analysis. In the literature, this procedure is sometimes criticized 
because the weights strongly depend on the outcome variable used for the estimation (Howell et al., 2007). 
Because we lack a suitable outcome variable for tax complexity, we employ our own weights. 
34
  This approach is also applied by Simmons (2003). 
35
  All tax code weighting factors are provided in Appendix 2. 
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where 𝑑 = Complexity of dimension 𝑥 = Complexity rating 𝑤 = Weighting factor 𝑗 = Dimension (1 = additional local and industry-specific income taxes, …,  
15 = transfer pricing) 𝑖 = Complexity driver (1 = ambiguity & interpretation, …, 5 = record keeping) 
The tax framework complexity subindex is calculated in a similar manner. However, we assign 
equal weights to its dimensions and complexity drivers because it would not have been possible 
to determine reliable differentiated weights for the large number of tax framework complexity 
drivers. Hence, the tax framework complexity subindex is computed as follows: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 15 ∑ 𝑑𝑗5𝑗=1   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   𝑑𝑗 = 1𝑛𝑗 ∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑗𝑛𝑗𝑖=1  (2) 
where 𝑑 = Complexity of dimension 𝑥 = Complexity rating 𝑗 = Dimension (1 = tax guidance, …, 5 = tax appeals) 𝑖 = Complexity driver (specific to each dimension) 𝑛 = Number of complexity drivers 
The final step is to calculate the total tax complexity index. We call this index the Tax Com-
plexity Index (TCI). From prior literature and conversations with tax practitioners, we infer 
that the tax code and the tax framework are nearly equally important. Hence, we calculate the 
TCI as the arithmetic mean of both the tax code and the tax framework subindex. Theoretically, 
all indices can range between zero (not complex at all) and one (extremely complex).36 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝑇𝐶𝐼)= 1 2⁄ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥+ 1 2⁄  𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (3) 
 
36
  Compared with other tax measures, such as the statutory tax rate, a change in our measure may be somewhat 
difficult to interpret since it is composed of several different elements. If we take a complexity driver of the 
tax framework such as inconsistent decisions of tax officers, as an example, we see that, if this aspect becomes 
a problem in a country (while it was not a problem before), the TCI of this country changes by approximately 
0.01. Future research can nonetheless interpret the results related to the TCI, for example, by comparing them 
to the magnitude of the results for other variables. 
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In the following, we will present our results for both the TCI and its subindices. A closer look 
at each subindex provides valuable information and additional insight into tax complexity. It 
also enables us to compare the subindices and to analyze whether there are differences between 
tax code and tax framework complexity. Moreover, the implications of the weights of the tax 
code and the tax framework subindex are made transparent when calculating the TCI. In the 
first part of the analysis, we will also break down the subindices into their dimensions and 
complexity drivers. Therefore, we will eliminate claims associated with the weighting of indi-
cators.37 
Collinearity and index validation 
Because each dimension should have a distinct influence on the latent variable, very high cor-
relations between the dimensions would be critical. The correlation matrices in panel A and B 
of Table 3 show that nearly all dimensions of both subindices are significantly correlated. How-
ever, there are no perfect correlations and even no multicollinearity issues.38 With regard to the 
subindices, panel C of Table 3 shows that the correlation between the indices is not statistically 
significant. We conclude that the two subindices measure different areas of complexity.39 
[Table 3 near here] 
The final step in the validation process is to test the external validity of the TCI, i.e. the extent 
to which the index actually captures the construct. Given the lack of different cross-country 
 
37
  In general, we understand the weights we use in this paper to calculate our TCI as baseline weights. To account 
for individual preferences, the weights could be adjusted. A tool that makes it possible to use a custom 
weighting scheme is available on our project homepage. See www.taxcomplexity.org. 
38
  In untabulated analyses, we calculate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each dimension both within each 
subindex and among the subindices. All VIFs are clearly below the commonly applied threshold of 10 and 
even below the threshold of five. We therefore do not expect multicollinearity to be a problem (Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991; Law & Wong, 1999; Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006). 
39
  We also examine the correlations between the dimensions of the tax code (tax framework) and the tax frame-
work (tax code) subindex as well as the correlations between the dimensions of the tax code and the dimensions 
of the tax framework, and find some significant correlations that, however, are mostly weak. This finding 
suggests that there are certain links between tax code and tax framework complexity but that, overall, both 
subindices are relatively independent from each other. 
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reflective tax complexity measures to apply the common multiple indicators-multiple causes 
(MIMIC) model (Jöreskog & Goldberger, 1975), we are unable to fully evaluate the external 
validity. As an alternative to test the external validity, we analyze how the TCI matches up 
with other composite measures of tax complexity, namely  the Paying Taxes measure of PwC 
et al. (2017) and the country ranking of the Financial Complexity Index40 of the TMF Group 
(2017, 2018). We also investigate the relationship with the components of the Paying Taxes 
measure (total tax rate, time to comply, tax payments, post-filing index). The correlations are 
displayed in Table 4. All variables are defined in panel A of Appendix 3. For the overall Paying 
Taxes measure, the post-filing index and the Financial Complexity Index, countries are ranked 
in descending order (i.e., value/ranking decreases with the level of complexity), and we expect 
the associations between our complexity measures and these measures to be negative. In con-
trast, we expect the correlations between our complexity measures and the other components 
of the Paying Taxes measures, whose values are ranked in ascending order, to be positive. 
[Table 4 near here] 
We find that all significant correlations have the expected sign. Our TCI is significantly nega-
tively correlated with the overall Paying Taxes measure and the post-filing index. Furthermore, 
we find a moderate positive correlation between the TCI and the Paying Taxes component time 
to comply.41 Overall, the results indicate that a complex tax system is associated with a higher 
compliance burden. When we examine the correlations of our tax framework complexity sub-
index, we find the expected correlations for all the Paying Taxes measures. In contrast, the tax 
code complexity subindex is not correlated with any of the Paying Taxes measures. This might 
 
40
  The rankings of the Financial Complexity Index of the TMF Group are available for 2017 and 2018 only; thus, 
they are not directly comparable to our 2016 complexity data. The correlation between the two rankings is 
approximately 0.76, and the mean rank difference is approximately -0.87, indicating little change over the two 
years. However, the results obtained should be interpreted carefully.  
41
  In an untabulated analysis, we find that the strength of the relationship between the TCI and the Paying Taxes 
component time to comply increases when we restrict the time to comply component to corporates taxes. This 
result may be an argument in favor of really measuring corporate tax complexity with the TCI. 
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be attributed to the close relationship of these measures to our definition of the tax framework. 
Because Paying Taxes, in particular, captures the filing, payment and audit process, we also 
investigate the association with the respective dimensions of our tax framework subindex. For 
both the filing and payments and the audits dimension, we find significant correlations with 
the majority of the Paying Taxes measures. The correlations with the filing and payments di-
mension are among the highest that we observe. Regarding the Financial Complexity Index, 
we find a strong correlation between our TCI and the 2017 as well as the 2018 ranking of the 
Financial Complexity Index. Results similar to that obtained from investigating their associa-
tion with the Paying Taxes measure are observed when we consider our two subindices. 
Overall, we find strong correlations with the Paying Taxes measure and the Financial Com-
plexity Index, which supports the validity of our construct. We are aware that both measures 
are not perfectly suited to test the external validity of our construct. However, they are the only 
country-level measures that are currently available for a large number of countries and capture 
highly related constructs. To further validate our measures, we discussed our results with in-
house tax experts of MNCs, tax consultants and tax authorities from several countries. They 
not only confirmed our results to a large extent but also provided anecdotal evidence that con-
tributed to a more comprehensive understanding of our results. 
4. Results 
Tax Complexity Index and subindices 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the TCI and its subindices. The sample-wide mean 
and median of the TCI, which may serve as benchmarks, are both 0.37. Overall, a country that 
is either not complex at all (0) or extremely complex (1) has not been observed. Instead, the 
index values range between 0.19 and 0.53. The country with the most complex tax system is 
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Brazil (0.53). This result is similar to that of the TMF Group (2017) and PwC et al. (2017).42 
Even the press often considers Brazil as having “one of the most complex tax systems in the 
world”43. In our ranking, it is closely followed by Colombia (0.52), Egypt (0.51), Albania 
(0.50), and Zimbabwe (0.49). In contrast, the top five countries with the lowest levels of total 
tax complexity are Jersey (0.19), Nicaragua (0.20), Mauritius (0.22), Estonia (0.22), and 
Yemen (0.23). Because we restrict our analysis to countries that impose taxes on corporate 
income, typical tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands, are not included in our sample. None-
theless, we still find that our TCI varies substantially across the sample countries, with a vari-
ation coefficient of 0.19.44 
[Table 5 near here] 
The mean and median values for tax code complexity are 0.43 and 0.45, respectively, while 
those for tax framework complexity are both 0.30. Moreover, we find substantial variation in 
both subindices, with variation coefficients of 0.24 (tax code) and 0.27 (tax framework). With 
regard to the tax code, Colombia (0.64), the Philippines (0.63), Brazil (0.61), Ghana (0.58) and 
Chile (0.58) are the most complex countries. The least complex countries are Nicaragua (0.12), 
Estonia (0.18), Jersey (0.20), Bulgaria (0.23), and Yemen (0.25). For tax code complexity, the 
list of the five most complex countries is quite different from that of the top-five countries 
whose complexity is based on the TCI, while the list of the five least complex countries is very 
similar to the five least complex TCI countries.45 Ranked by the tax framework, we observe 
the reverse pattern: the five most complex countries are almost the same as those for the TCI, 
 
42
  Brazil is the second most complex country out of 94 countries in the TMF Group (2017) and the sixth most 
complex country out of 189 countries in PwC et al. (2017). 
43
  See Machado and Utimati (2017). 
44
  As a measure of dispersion, to allow for comparisons between different variables, we use the variation coeffi-
cient instead of the standard deviation. See Bedeian and Mossholder (2000) for some further details on this 
measure. 
45
  Only two countries, Brazil and Colombia, belong to both the list of the five most complex tax systems and the 
list of the five most complex tax codes. In contrast, four countries belong to the lists of the five least complex 
tax systems and tax codes. 
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with Zimbabwe (0.54) having the highest level of tax framework complexity, followed by Al-
bania (0.50), Ethiopia (0.47), Brazil (0.46) and Egypt (0.45). The five countries with the lowest 
tax framework complexity are largely different, with only Mauritius (0.14) included in both 
the top-five TCI and the top-five tax framework complexity list. The remaining countries with 
the least complex tax frameworks are Liechtenstein (0.12), the Netherlands (0.16), Singapore 
(0.17) and Japan (0.18). 
To obtain an impression of the similarities and differences between tax code and tax framework 
complexity, we classify countries and assign complexity values to five levels, ranging from 
very low to very high, based on the quintiles of each complexity measure. The results are dis-
played in Appendix 4. We find that only one fifth of our sample (20 countries) receives the 
same classification for both subindices. In 38 countries, the tax framework has a higher classi-
fication, i.e., is more complex than the tax code, while in 42 countries, the tax code is more 
complex than the tax framework. Figure 2 plots the values of the tax code complexity subindex 
against the values of the tax framework complexity subindex, providing additional evidence 
for this mixed picture. Although this finding seems to be surprising, because a high level of tax 
code complexity may be expected to encourage a high level of tax framework complexity, the 
finding is consistent with some of the respondents’ comments. For example, one respondent 
highlighted in the free text field that in his country, “regulations are of a good quality, but 
implementation is complicated” because of the “lack of professional skills at the administrative 
and judicial level”. Furthermore, some respondents also mentioned specific instruments within 
the areas of the tax framework intended to suppress complexities that may arise from the com-
plexity of the tax regulations, such as rulings or special audit procedures. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
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In the last step, we address our results from a broader perspective and specifically examine the 
member and nonmember countries of the OECD.46 The descriptive statistics are provided in 
Table 6. With regard to the TCI, we do not find a significant difference between the mean 
complexity values of the OECD (0.36) and the non-OECD (0.37) countries. Hence, OECD 
countries, on average, have the same level of total tax complexity as non-OECD countries. 
When we analyze the complexity levels of the OECD countries provided in Appendix 4, we 
obtain a very balanced picture. There are 12 countries with a low or very low level of complex-
ity, 12 countries with a medium level of complexity and 9 countries with a high to very high 
level of complexity. The classifications also reveal that OECD countries that often claim to 
have the most complex tax system in the world, such as Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, only have a medium level of total tax complexity. 
[Table 6 near here] 
Unlike the difference in the TCI between OECD and non-OECD countries, significant differ-
ences are observed between OECD and non-OECD countries for the tax code as well as the tax 
framework subindex. While the mean tax code subindex for the OECD countries (0.46) is sig-
nificantly greater than the mean tax code subindex for the non-OECD countries (0.41), we find 
the opposite for the mean tax framework subindex. The latter is significantly lower in OECD 
countries (0.26) than in non-OECD countries (0.33). Hence, OECD countries, on average, have 
a more complex tax code and a less complex tax framework than do non-OECD countries. 
Reconsidering the countries that often claim to have the most complex tax systems in the world, 
these countries are characterized by a high or very high level of tax code complexity but a low 
 
46
  We refer to the OECD classification of the year in which our survey was carried out (2016). Therefore, Lith-
uania, which joined the OECD in 2018, is not considered an OECD member country. Furthermore, Iceland 
and Latvia are not included in our sample. This results in 33 OECD countries in our sample. 
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level of tax framework complexity. Hence, their claims seem to relate to the tax code and not 
necessarily to the tax framework. 
Insights into the dimensions of tax code and framework complexity 
To provide more insight into the complexity of the tax code and the tax framework, we turn to 
their dimensions and the underlying complexity drivers. Panel A of Table 7 shows the descrip-
tive statistics of the tax code dimensions. We find that transfer pricing regulations have the 
highest average level of complexity (0.60) and thus contribute most to the countries’ tax code 
complexity.47 These regulations are considered to be the most complex in Russia (0.86), Aus-
tralia (0.84) and Brazil (0.82). The main complexity drivers of transfer pricing regulations are 
record keeping as well as ambiguity and interpretation (see Appendix 5). General anti-avoid-
ance (0.48) and investment incentives (0.47) regulations are ranked second and third in com-
plexity. However, they are closely followed by other regulations, such as those on corporate 
reorganization (0.46). Similar to transfer pricing regulations, the complexity of regulations on 
general anti-avoidance is strongly characterized by ambiguity and interpretation as well as rec-
ord keeping.48 The complexity of regulations on investment incentives is more strongly deter-
mined by record keeping, change and detail. 
[Table 7 near here] 
In contrast, certain dimensions of the tax code are considered less complex and thus contribute 
only a small extent to the complexity of the tax code. The lowest average complexity level of 
0.17 belongs to (alternative) minimum tax regulations. This result seems surprising given that 
(alternative) minimum tax rules are sometimes considered highly complex in countries such as 
the United States, at least prior to 2018. However, there are only a few countries that have such 
 
47
  This is consistent with the notion that transfer pricing is often considered as one of the most burdensome tax 
areas (e.g., Klassen et al., 2017; Mescall & Klassen, 2018). 
48
  In line with this finding, studies, such as that of Laplante et al. (2019), focus the ambiguity in the tax law. 
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complex rules. Regarding the complexity drivers, the complexity of (alternative) minimum tax 
regulations is almost equally determined by all complexity drivers. The countries in which 
(alternative) minimum tax regulations are perceived as the most complex are India (0.59), the 
Philippines (0.57) and Ecuador (0.55).49 For this regulation, we further observe a variation 
coefficient of 0.90, the highest level of relative variation. Additional local and industry-specific 
taxes represent the dimension with the second lowest level of complexity overall (0.29). As for 
(alternative) minimum tax regulations, certain countries do not levy additional local and indus-
try-specific taxes at all. If such rules exist, they are often complex, with change being the most 
important complexity driver. The highest country complexity levels are found in Colombia 
(0.67), the United States (0.66) and Kenya (0.63). 
With respect to the remaining dimensions, the mean complexity levels range between 0.35 for 
group treatment and 0.46 for corporate reorganization and interest. By considering the com-
plexity drivers across all dimensions, we find that record keeping contributes the most to tax 
code complexity, followed by detail, ambiguity and interpretation, changes and computation. 
Finally, we conclude that tax codes are not characterized by the different dimensions and com-
plexity drivers in the same way, as there is much variation within both aspects across countries. 
Turning to the tax framework, panel B of Table 7 displays the descriptive statistics for its di-
mensions. On average, tax audits (0.43) contribute most to the tax framework complexity 
across countries.50 We obtain the highest levels of tax audits complexity for Zimbabwe (0.85), 
Ethiopia (0.79) and Afghanistan (0.70). In contrast, tax filing and payments (0.23) have the 
lowest impact. Nonetheless, certain countries are characterized by rather high levels of filing 
and payments complexity, such as Zimbabwe (0.52), Brazil (0.49) and Colombia (0.45). This 
 
49
  In the United States, (alternative) minimum tax regulations obtain a value of 0.42. Therefore, the United States 
is one of the top-10 countries with the most complex regulations on (alternative) minimum taxation. 
50
  Tax audits appear to be very relevant not only in terms of tax complexity. There are several studies that provide 
evidence for a link between tax audits and firm behavior (e.g., Beuselinck et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2018). 
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dimension is closely followed by tax appeals (0.25). Tax guidance and tax law enactment ex-
hibit similar levels of complexity (0.31 and 0.30). 
As illustrated in Appendix 5, we find that the high average level of tax audits complexity is 
induced by several different complexity drivers. One of these drivers is the length of the statute 
of limitations and the associated uncertainty. Only a few countries have a short statute of lim-
itations. In most countries, between three or five years or even more than five years after a tax 
return has been filed, tax authorities have the right to perform a tax audit and to adjust the tax 
payable amount. Another driver is the decision-making of tax officers during the audit process. 
The tax officers’ decisions are often perceived as inconsistent and vary from one officer to 
another or even for the same officer. As a result, predicting the audit outcome or preparing tax 
returns based on prior experience can become difficult. Moreover, tax audit complexity is also 
driven to a large extent by the tax officers’ lack of experience or skills, which results in misun-
derstandings and mistakes. A substantial level of complexity also comes from the inability to 
anticipate a tax audit. In particular, the selection criteria for tax audit targets are frequently not 
disclosed. Thus, due to a lack of information, MNCs often do not know in advance whether 
they are subject to an audit. 
Two main drivers affect tax guidance: international soft law51 and accounting standards. Re-
garding international soft law, complexity is triggered by the fact that in dealing with national 
law, these rules do not offer support by providing additional information but rather contradict 
national practice. These contradictions often make it even more difficult to apply national law. 
Turning to accounting standards, complexity is shaped by the differences between Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and tax rules. As the two sets of rules have different 
 
51
  We define international soft law as rules that are neither strictly binding in nature nor completely lacking legal 
significance. The term refers to guidelines, policy declarations or codes of conduct that are not legally enforce-
able. OECD guidelines are an example of soft law. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469663
26 
 
objectives, they often deviate from each other. Therefore, adjustments to the accounting treat-
ment are necessary to comply with the tax rules, and these adjustments require additional effort 
and time. 
Three drivers have a strong influence on tax law enactment complexity across countries. The 
strongest influence is exerted by the (lack of) quality of tax legislation drafting. Due to poorly 
conceived drafts, overcomplicated texts or inaccurate translations, problems arise after or 
sometimes even before the enactment of a draft. Another strong driver of tax law enactment 
complexity is the time between the announcement of tax changes and their enactment. Pro-
posed tax law changes are often enacted without prior announcements. This practice is usually 
intended to prevent taxpayers from using the proposed changes to plan their transactions ahead 
in a manner that will avoid the expected outcome of the changes. In this vein, a proposal is 
discussed and adopted without any public involvement. Accordingly, there are no calls for 
comments. From the perspective of MNCs, this practice is often critical because it does not 
allow them to anticipate and react to unintended consequences that the changes may have. 
Moreover, it creates permanent uncertainty for planning purposes. Similarly, tax law enactment 
complexity is generally strongly driven by the time at which the legislation becomes effective. 
Often, changes become effective on the date of enactment or even before (retrospective appli-
cation), thus creating significant uncertainty and, hence, potential costs for MNCs. 
Although tax filing and payments as well as tax appeals contribute, on average, less to tax 
framework complexity, they also require some attention. Similar to tax guidance complexity, 
there are two main complexity drivers for tax filing and payment complexity. The most fre-
quently chosen driver is the lack of permission to file a consolidated tax return. Instead, each 
entity must file a separate return, thus ensuring high compliance costs for large groups. The 
second most frequent driver is the process of refunding overpaid taxes, which regularly causes 
problems. These problems may result from complicated application requirements, tight 
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deadlines and long processing times of the tax authority for refunds of overpaid taxes. The 
resulting tax refund uncertainty can distort MNCs’ decisions. Timing also plays an important 
role in tax appeals. The most frequent driver of tax appeals complexity is the time period be-
tween the filing of an appeal at the judicial level and its resolution. Appeals to courts often take 
1 to 3 years to be resolved.52 These long time periods impose substantial costs. For instance, if 
an MNC loses an appeal, it usually has to pay high rates of interest. 
Similar to the tax code, in the tax framework, there is also considerable variation across coun-
tries in the level of complexity of the different dimensions and in the complexity drivers. For 
example, both tax appeals and tax filing and payments have relatively high variation coeffi-
cients. When considering the complexity drivers, the variation is even higher. 
5. Comparison with other country characteristics 
In this section, we compare our TCI and its subindices with an independent set of other country 
measures that are generally used in cross-country studies. The aim is not to explain tax com-
plexity based on other country characteristics, but rather to determine whether there is any 
correlation between our indices and other commonly used characteristics. Hence, we follow an 
explorative approach and use bivariate correlation analysis to identify the extent to which our 
indices and the other characteristics coincide. To structure the analysis, we categorize the coun-
try characteristics into three groups: economic, political/legal and tax characteristics. The de-
scriptive statistics on the country characteristics are provided in Appendix 6. 
Economic country characteristics 
Economic characteristics describe the state of a country’s economy and include the size of a 
country measured by the population, the aggregate output as measured by the gross domestic 
product (GDP), the development level measured by the Human Development Index, the 
 
52
  For example, in Germany, the average duration of appeal proceedings at the level of the Federal Fiscal Court 
in 2018 was 20 months. See Bundesfinanzhof (2019).  
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internationalization of capital flows measured as the net in-flow of investments, the infrastruc-
ture measured by the telephone lines and the income inequality measured by the GINI index 
(Fauver et al. 2017; Shevlin et al. 2019). Ex ante, the direction of the relationships with tax 
complexity is not clear. On the one hand, the tax system could be a mirror of the economy 
reflecting its complexities. Hence, more complex tax systems would be associated with more 
economically sophisticated countries. On the other hand, due to high compliance costs and a 
high level of uncertainty, tax complexity could also affect a country by suppressing economic 
activity. As a result, more complex tax systems would be associated with less economically 
sophisticated economies. Table 8, panel A reports the results of the analysis. Among the vari-
ables, we find both positive and negative associations. With respect to the population, the as-
sociation with our TCI is positive. However, at the level of the subindices, the association is 
only significant for the tax code subindex. Hence, larger countries tend to have more complex 
tax codes. We obtain a similar result for the GDP. However, for the GDP, we also find a neg-
ative association with the tax framework subindex, although it has a much stronger association 
with the tax code subindex, resulting in a positive association between total tax complexity and 
the GDP. In contrast, for foreign investments, the positive association with the tax code subin-
dex seems to be offset by the negative association with the tax framework subindex. As a result, 
we do not find a significant association with the TCI. The results are different for the develop-
ment level and the infrastructure. For both characteristics, we find a negative association with 
the tax framework complexity subindex. Therefore, more developed countries tend to have less 
complex tax frameworks. This negative association also remains at the level of the TCI. We do 
not find any significant association between the tax complexity indices and income inequality. 
When we consider the strengths of the associations, we do not find (very) strong associations 
among the selected country characteristics. The Pearson coefficients for the TCI vary between 
-0.33 (infrastructure) and 0.47 (population), indicating weak to moderate relationships. At the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469663
29 
 
level of the subindices, the Pearson coefficients are slightly larger and vary between -0.45 (de-
velopment) and 0.52 (GDP). Overall, we conclude that economically sophisticated countries 
tend to have a more complex tax code and a less complex tax framework. Regarding the TCI, 
a clear tendency is not observed. 
[Table 8 near here] 
Political and legal country characteristics 
Political and legal characteristics capture the strength of a country’s government. We focus on 
general governance as measured by the six governance proxies from the World Bank's World-
wide Governance Indicators project (Beck et al. 2014; Akins et al. 2017; Andries et al. 2017; 
Langenmayr & Lester 2018; Williams 2018).53 These proxies cover the following: voice and 
accountability (i.e., the ability of citizens to participate in choosing the government), political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism (i.e., the likelihood that the government will lose its 
power by unconstitutional means), government effectiveness (i.e., the quality of public ser-
vices), regulatory quality (i.e., the ability of the government to introduce sound regulations), 
rule of law (i.e., the trust in the rules of society) and control of corruption (i.e., the ability to 
influence public power). Strong governance in a country could spill over to the tax system, thus 
strengthening the quality of the law and making it less complex. In contrast, a complex tax 
system might also be susceptible to low governance or loose rights and induce corruption and 
other types of misconduct. As illustrated in panel B of Table 8, we find a negative association 
between our TCI and all governance indicators. Therefore, countries with a higher level of total 
tax complexity tend to be associated with less participation ability for its citizens, a lower level 
of political stability, a lower level of government effectiveness, lower regulatory quality, lower 
trust in rules and lower control of corruption. However, similar to the correlation coefficients 
 
53
  See Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) for a review of the indicators. 
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for the economic characteristics, the Pearson correlation coefficients for the governance indi-
cators are relatively small and range from -0.22 (voice and accountability) to -0.38 (regulatory 
quality). When we examine the tax complexity subindices, we observe negative relationships 
with the tax framework complexity subindex. We find correlation coefficients that are consid-
erably larger in magnitude, ranging from -0.39 (political stability) to -0.62 (rule of law). In 
contrast, there is no systematic correlation between the governance indicators and the tax code 
complexity subindex. 
In summary, the results provide support for the view that tax complexity is negatively associ-
ated with political/legal characteristics. This association seems to be driven by the tax frame-
work. 
Tax system characteristics 
Finally, we focus on the association between our tax complexity indices and common tax coun-
try variables. We investigate the association with the statutory tax rate, the effective average 
tax rate and the effective marginal tax rate as well as the tax attractiveness measured by the 
Tax Attractiveness Index (Overesch & Wamser, 2010; Beuselinck et al., 2015; Cristea & Ngu-
yen, 2016; Schanz et al., 2017a, b). We further shed light on the association between tax com-
plexity and the size of the shadow economy, which is assumed to be closely linked to tax eva-
sion (Kirchgässner, 2011; Neck et al., 2012; Medina & Schneider, 2018). For the OECD coun-
tries, we also analyze their tax competitiveness. Tax systems with high tax rates could be more 
complex because they might be affected by base erosion and profit shifting, for which compre-
hensive anti-avoidance regulations have been enacted to prevent it. In addition to specific 
measures in the tax code, countries could also employ specific measures within the tax frame-
work, such as aggressive tax audits, to strengthen enforcement and keep companies from shift-
ing their profits to low-tax countries. The results of the analysis on the tax characteristics are 
provided in panel C of Table 8. Regarding the association between our TCI and the tax rate 
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measures, we only find a weak significant positive association for the statutory tax rate, indi-
cated by the Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.24. As shown by the coefficient of 0.35, the 
association is somewhat stronger for the tax code complexity subindex. Furthermore, we find 
a weak positive association between the tax code complexity subindex and the effective aver-
age tax rate. Hence, countries with a higher level of tax code complexity tend to have a higher 
statutory tax rate and a higher effective average tax rate. In contrast, there is no association 
between the tax rate measures and the tax framework complexity subindex. With regard to a 
country’s tax attractiveness, we find a negative association between our TCI and the Tax At-
tractiveness index, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.48. Thus, countries with a higher 
level of tax complexity tend to be less attractive. The association remains negative for both the 
tax code (-0.31) and the tax framework subindex (-0.45). For tax competitiveness, we also 
observe significant negative associations with the TCI (-0.30) and the tax code complexity 
subindex (-0.45). Furthermore, we observe a positive association between the shadow economy 
and the TCI (0.24), which is driven by the tax framework complexity subindex (0.54), indicat-
ing that tax evasion seems to be a more serious problem in countries with more complex tax 
frameworks. Overall, we find some evidence for a positive association between tax complexity 
and different tax rate measures and the size of the shadow economy as well as negative asso-
ciations between tax complexity and the tax attractiveness/tax competitiveness of a country. 
In conclusion, our findings highlight that tax complexity is associated with several common 
country characteristics. However, the associations are often not strong, which supports the view 
of tax complexity as a distinct country feature that should be accounted for in future cross-
country tax research studies. Nonetheless, all findings should be interpreted with caution be-
cause we only focus on associations and do not take interdependencies of these relationships 
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into account. Because these investigations are not the focus of this paper, we leave them to 
future research.54 
6. Robustness tests 
To test for the robustness of our results, we conduct two sets of robustness checks. The first set 
focuses on the survey instrument that has been used for data collection. One common concern 
in survey research is that the results may depend on the individual characteristics of the re-
spondents. To account for this potential problem, we gathered a comprehensive list of demo-
graphic information as displayed in Table 2. We use this demographic information to test for 
significantly different responses across demographic groups of respondents within countries 
with at least 20 observations by using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.55 For this purpose, we divide 
the country samples into two subsamples for each demographic variable.56 We focus on the 
TCI, the tax code complexity subindex and the tax framework complexity subindex. In 
untabulated results, we carry out 262 tests in total. For only 25 tests and, hence, a share of less 
than ten percent of all tests, statistically significant differences are observed at conventional 
significance levels. Three remarks on this analysis need to be made. First, a clustering of sig-
nificant differences is not observed in specific countries. The number of differences ranges 
from zero (Germany) to four (Australia and United Kingdom). Second, clustering with regard 
to the complexity variable under consideration is not observed. We find eight significant dif-
ferences for the TCI, ten significant differences for the tax code complexity subindex and seven 
significant differences for the tax framework complexity subindex. Third, and most 
 
54
  Because the survey will be repeated every two years and more data will become available, it will also become 
easier to focus on causal relationships. 
55
  Because we need at least a couple of observations for the different demographic groups, we expect a total 
number of 20 observations per country to be sufficient for this kind of test. The 11 resulting countries under 
investigation are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Ukraine, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
56
  We do not make use of the variable specialization, as more than 85% of the sample specializes in income 
taxes. Hence, in most countries, there is only a very small number of respondents (and sometimes no respond-
ents) that do not specialize in income taxes. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469663
33 
 
importantly, there is no specific trend in the responses regarding a specific complexity variable. 
For example, in Australia, partners, directors or principals consider the tax code more complex 
than do other respondents, while in Ukraine, they consider it less complex than do other re-
spondents. Overall, the findings from this analysis indicate that the demographic background 
does not seem to have a crucial impact on the responses. 
Another concern with regard to the survey instrument might be the different weights of the 
complexity drivers and the regulations in the tax code we use to account for their varying de-
grees of importance. As a robustness check, we recalculate the tax code complexity subindex 
and the TCI by using equal weights. To evaluate the results, we rank the 100 sample countries 
according to their level of complexity from one (lowest level of complexity) to 100 (highest 
level of complexity) by using both the importance-weighting and the equal-weighting approach 
and compare the rankings. In untabulated results, we observe a maximum absolute difference 
of three ranks for the TCI (tax code complexity subindex) for 81 (72) out of 100 countries. 
None of the countries show an absolute difference of more than ten ranks for the TCI. For the 
tax code complexity subindex, only three countries with such a difference are observed (Af-
ghanistan, Bangladesh, and Czech Republic). Overall, the results are not fundamentally af-
fected by the importance weighting. 
The second set of robustness checks investigates the sensitivity of the associations between tax 
complexity and other country characteristics. First, the results of the correlation analysis may 
be driven by the degree of variation in our complexity data. While many country characteris-
tics, such as a country’s statutory tax rate, are directly and easily observable, it could be some-
what difficult to precisely determine the level of tax complexity. To address this concern, we 
use the complexity levels of Appendix 4 and rerun the bivariate correlation analysis based on 
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these quintiles. The results are displayed in Appendix 7.57 The tables show that the results are 
very similar to those based on the index values, and nearly the same associations are observed. 
Moreover, the magnitudes of the associations are also quite similar. 
Second, because our sample consists of heterogeneous countries, it could also be argued that 
some results are driven by extreme values. We analyze this potential problem by eliminating 
extreme values and rerunning the correlation analysis based on the new samples. We eliminate 
three different types of extreme values. First, we exclude the lower percentile of each country 
characteristic. Second, we exclude the upper percentile. Third, we exclude both the lower and 
the upper percentile of each country characteristic. The results are displayed in Appendix 8. 
For most country characteristics, we obtain very robust results. None of our main findings for 
the economic and political/legal characteristics change. For the tax characteristics, we obtain 
very robust results for the correlation between the statutory tax rate and the tax code complexity 
subindex as well as between the tax attractiveness of a country and the TCI/tax framework 
complexity subindex. Overall, we find considerable evidence that the main results of the cor-
relation analysis in Section 5 are not systematically affected by extreme values. 
Finally, we address concerns that might arise from the choice of country characteristics. To 
exclude the possibility that there are country characteristics that exhibit a completely different 
correlation pattern, such as very strong correlations, with the TCI and its subindices, we rerun 
the correlation analysis with a variety of other economic characteristics (e.g., GDP growth and 
trade intensity), political/legal characteristics (e.g., investor protection rights and legal origin; 
Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2008) and tax characteristics (e.g., worldwide versus ter-
ritorial tax system; Markle, 2016). In untabulated analyses, we do not find correlation patterns 
that differ from the prior patterns to a large extent and, thus, would affect our conclusions. 
 
57
  Because the complexity variables are now ordinal data, we only report the Spearman correlation coefficients. 
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Because recent cross-country studies (Ahern et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2017) have increasingly 
focused on the effects of social norms and cultural values, we also examine the correlations 
between our tax complexity measures and these country characteristics (e.g., cultural attributes; 
Hofstede, 1980). However, in untabulated analyses, we do not find uniform correlation pat-
terns. Often, the associations are insignificant. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduce the TCI, which is composed of two subindices, the tax code and the 
tax framework subindex, and represents a new and innovative way to assess the corporate in-
come tax complexity faced by MNCs using survey data. 
For a sample of 100 countries for the year 2016, we find considerable variation in the overall 
level of tax complexity across countries. There are certain countries that have a quite similar 
high or low level of both tax code and tax framework complexity, while others present large 
differences in their tax code and tax framework complexity. From a global perspective, tax 
code complexity is strongly affected by the complexity of transfer pricing regulations. In con-
trast, tax framework complexity is strongly influenced by the complexity of tax audits. In our 
correlation analysis, we observe that countries with a very complex tax code tend to have a 
larger population, a higher GDP, and higher tax rates. Countries with a very complex tax frame-
work tend to have a lower GDP, a poorer infrastructure, a lower development level, and a lower 
quality of governance in place. In accordance with these correlation patterns, many highly in-
dustrialized countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom or the United States, are charac-
terized by high tax code complexity but low tax framework complexity. These countries are 
also among those that strongly promote fair and equitable tax policies. Hence, the high level of 
tax code complexity in these countries may be interpreted as a reflection of those policies, 
which could have positive implications for their economies. 
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Our study is subject to some limitations. First, respondents might not have adopted the per-
spective they were asked to take. For our project, it was crucial that the participants answer the 
questions on their country’s corporate income tax system from the perspective of an MNC. At 
the beginning of the survey, we asked them to take this view and frequently repeated important 
terms, such as “your country” or “for MNCs”, throughout the survey. Second, we received a 
relatively low number of responses from several countries. We address this point by excluding 
all countries in which only one or two people participated and performed several tests on the 
quality of the responses collected. Furthermore, we obtained a sample of highly experienced 
and skilled tax consultants; therefore, we do not expect this issue to be a concern. Finally, our 
analyses are basic and illustrative. For brevity and to highlight general patterns, we focused on 
selected interesting results without exploiting the whole richness of the underlying data. Be-
cause the new data are limited to 2016, our analyses are not able to show causal effects of tax 
complexity. With new data on tax complexity becoming available, future research will be able 
to approach research questions on the causal effects of tax complexity. It will also be possible 
to replicate studies that have used prior tax complexity measures and to draw conclusions from 
the comparison of different measures.   
Our study is the first to establish a comprehensive tax complexity measure for a large number 
of countries. We provide future research with valuable proxies that can be used to study the 
implications of tax complexity, e.g., the impact of tax complexity on foreign direct investments 
or profit shifting. Future research might further investigate the predictive power of country 
characteristics for tax complexity, distinguish between necessary and unnecessary complexity 
and identify the “right” level of tax complexity by taking the consequences of tax complexity 
into account. In addition to using the index for research, it might also be used to derive policy 
implications, e.g., by benchmarking a specific country against the worldwide average or against 
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peer countries. Finally, the index might be considered for corporate decision making or tax 
advisory purposes. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. Overview of complexity drivers 
 
Panel A: Tax code complexity drivers 
# Complexity driver Survey question Definitions provided in the survey are in italics 
Operationalization 
0 = Least complex,  
1 = Most complex 
(1) Ambiguity & inter-pretation 
To what extent do you think ambiguity & interpreta-
tion contribute to the complexity of the regulations 
listed below for MNCs in your country? 
Ambiguity & interpretation: When a regulation is 
phrased in an unclear, imprecise and/or ambiguous 
manner so that different interpretations are possible. 
0 = No extent 
0.25 = Little extent 
0.5 = Some extent 
0.75 = Great extent 
1 = Very great extent 
(2) Change 
To what extent do you think change contributes to the 
complexity of the regulations listed below for MNCs 
in your country? 
Change: When a regulation is frequently changed 
and the changes are extensive in terms of quantity 
and/or scope. 
0 = No extent 
0.25 = Little extent 
0.5 = Some extent 
0.75 = Great extent 
1 = Very great extent 
(3) Computation 
To what extent do you think computation contributes 
to the complexity of the regulations listed below for 
MNCs in your country? 
Computation: When many and/or sophisticated cal-
culations are necessary to prove the (non-)applica-
bility of a regulation and/or to determine the specific 
tax treatment. 
0 = No extent 
0.25 = Little extent 
0.5 = Some extent 
0.75 = Great extent 
1 = Very great extent 
(4) Detail 
To what extent do you think detail contributes to the 
complexity of the regulations listed below for MNCs 
in your country? 
Detail: When a regulation contains excessive details, 
such as numerous rules, exception to rules, and/or 
cross-references to other rules. 
0 = No extent 
0.25 = Little extent 
0.5 = Some extent 
0.75 = Great extent 
1 = Very great extent 
(5) Record keeping 
To what extent do you think record keeping contrib-
utes to the complexity of the regulations listed below 
for MNCs in your country? 
Record keeping: When many records and documents 
must be kept to substantiate all claims under a regu-
lation and/or to complete the tax return. 
0 = No extent 
0.25 = Little extent 
0.5 = Some extent 
0.75 = Great extent 
1 = Very great extent 
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Panel B: Tax framework complexity drivers 
# Complexity driver Survey question 
Definitions provided in the survey are in italics 
Operationalization 
0 = Least complex,  
1 = Most complex 
Dimension 1: Tax guidance 
(1) 
Differences between 
GAAP and tax regu-
lations 
To what extent do national generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP) for domestic reporting 
and/or income determination differ from the national 
tax regulations? 
0 = No extent 
0.25 = Little extent 
0.5 = Some extent 
0.75 = Great extent 
1 = Very great extent 
(2) Public binding rul-ings 
Does the tax authority in your country issue private 
binding rulings (including advance pricing agree-
ments)? 
Public rulings are published statements describing 
how a tax authority will apply the tax code in partic-
ular situations. They include anonymized answers to 
specific requests as well as general and specific ad-
ministrative guidance concerning, e.g., decrees and 
circulars. These public rulings are binding on the tax 
authority, meaning that taxpayers are protected from 
further assessment where they have acted in accord-
ance with the advice given in the ruling. 
0 = Yes 
1 = No 
(3) Private binding rul-ings 
Does the tax authority in your country issue private 
binding rulings (including advance pricing agree-
ments)? 
Private rulings are unpublished statements by the tax 
authority in response to specific requests from tax-
payers seeking clarification of how tax law would ap-
ply in relation to a proposed or completed transac-
tion. They are binding on the tax authority when the 
transactions are carried out as described in the re-
quest. 
0 = Yes 
1 = No 
(4) Non-binding oral or 
written advice 
Does the tax authority in your country provide non-
binding oral or written advice to resolve uncertainties 
when it comes to applying tax law to particular busi-
ness issues or transactions? 
Oral or written advice in this context is an informal 
opinion on tax matters that taxpayers can request by 
contacting the tax authority (e.g., by telephone or 
email). They are not binding on the tax authority. 
0 = Yes 
0.5 = No, but there is 
a common practice 
1 = No, and no com-
mon practice 
(5) Substantial business issues/transactions 
Are there various substantial business issues and/or 
transactions whose tax treatment is not codified in 
your country’s tax law? 
0 = No 
0.33 = Yes, but writ-
ten guidance exists 
0.66 = Yes, no guid-
ance but there is a 
common practice 
1 = Yes, and no writ-
ten guidance or com-
mon practice 
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(6) International soft law 
To what extent does the existence of international 
soft law offer support by providing additional infor-
mation in dealing with your country’s tax law? 
International soft law is defined as rules that are nei-
ther strictly binding in nature nor completely lacking 
legal significance. The term refers to guidelines, pol-
icy declarations or codes of conduct which are not le-
gally enforceable. OECD guidelines are an example 
of soft law. 
0 = Very great extent 
0.25 = Great extent 
0.5 = Some extent 
0.75 = Little extent 
1 = No extent 
Dimension 2: Tax law enactment 
(1) Defined enactment process 
Is the process by which tax legislation is enacted in 
your country defined by the constitution or any other 
law?  
The tax legislation process is the process by which a 
new tax regulation or a tax change is codified in the 
law. It begins with a legislative proposal. 
0 = Yes 
0.5 = No, but there is 
a common practice 
1 = No, and no com-
mon practice 
(2) Access to enacted tax legislation 
Regarding the tax legislative process in your country, 
which of the following aspects regularly cause prob-
lems? 
(a) Access to enacted tax legislation 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(3) Influence of third parties 
Regarding the tax legislative process in your country, 
which of the following aspects regularly cause prob-
lems? 
(b) Influence of third parties 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(4) Quality of tax legisla-
tion drafting 
Regarding the tax legislative process in your country, 
which of the following aspects regularly cause prob-
lems? 
(c) Quality of tax legislation drafting 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(5) 
Time at which legis-
lation becomes effec-
tive 
Regarding the tax legislative process in your country, 
which of the following aspects regularly cause prob-
lems? 
(d) Time at which tax legislation becomes effective 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(6) 
Time between the an-
nouncement and en-
actment of tax 
changes 
Regarding the tax legislative process in your country, 
which of the following aspects regularly cause prob-
lems? 
(e) Time between the announcement of tax changes 
and their enactment 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
Dimension 3: Tax filing and payments 
(1) Computing tax pay-
ments 
Regarding the payment of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(a) Computing tax payments 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(2) 
Determining due 
dates for tax pay-
ments 
Regarding the payment of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(b) Determining due dates for tax payments 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(3) 
Identifying the recipi-
ent(s) of tax pay-
ments 
Regarding the payment of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(c) Identifying the recipient(s) of tax payments 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
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(4) 
Managing the number 
of tax payments dur-
ing a year 
Regarding the payment of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(d) Managing the number of tax payments during a 
year 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(5) 
Refunding overpaid 
corporate income 
taxes 
Regarding the payment of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(e) Refunding overpaid corporate income taxes 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(6) (Electronic) remit-
tance of tax payments 
Regarding the payment of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(f) (Electronic) remittance of tax payments 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(7) 
Determining due 
dates for filing tax re-
turns 
Regarding the filing of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(a) Determining due dates for filing tax returns 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(8) Identifying the recipi-
ent(s) of tax returns 
Regarding the filing of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(b) Identifying the recipient(s) of tax returns 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(9) 
Managing the number 
of tax returns during 
a year 
Regarding the filing of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(c) Managing the number of tax returns during a year 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(10) Preparing tax returns 
Regarding the filing of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(d) Preparing tax returns 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(11) (Electronic) transmis-
sion of tax returns 
Regarding the filing of corporate income taxes in 
your country, which of the following aspects regu-
larly cause problems? 
(e) (Electronic) transmission of tax returns 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(12) Choice of tax year 
Does your country allow corporations to choose their 
tax year in accordance with the financial year they 
have chosen for accounting purposes? 
0 = Yes 
1 = No 
(13) Consolidated tax re-
turns 
Does your country allow parent corporations to sub-
mit a single consolidated tax return for the entire 
group, instead of all associated companies filing sep-
arate corporate income tax returns? 
0 = Yes 
1 = No 
(14) Instructions for filing 
tax returns 
Does the tax authority in your country provide writ-
ten instructions on how to file tax returns? 
0 = Yes 
0.5 = Yes, but they 
are not helpful 
1 = No 
Dimension 4: Tax audits 
(1) Defined tax audit process 
Do rules or other written guidelines exist in your 
country that clearly outline the tax audit process? 
0 = Yes 
0.5 = No, but there is 
a common practice 
1 = No, and no com-
mon practice exists 
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(2) Tax audit cycle 
Regarding the anticipation of tax audits in your coun-
try, which of the following do you consider a serious 
problem in your country? 
(a) Absence of a regular audit cycle 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(3) Notification of the 
upcoming tax audit 
Regarding the anticipation of tax audits in your coun-
try, which of the following do you consider a serious 
problem in your country? 
(b) Late or no notification of the upcoming tax audit 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(4) 
Disclosure of selec-
tion criteria for tax 
audit targets 
Regarding the anticipation of tax audits in your coun-
try, which of the following do you consider a serious 
problem in your country? 
(c) Little or no disclosure of selection criteria for tax 
audit targets 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(5) 
Communication of 
topics to be covered 
by the tax audit 
Regarding the anticipation of tax audits in your coun-
try, which of the following do you consider a serious 
problem in your country? 
(d) Poor or no communication of topics to be covered 
by the tax audit 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(6) Number of years cov-
ered by an audit 
How many tax years are usually covered by an ordi-
nary tax audit in your country? 
0 = One year 
0.5 = Between two 
and four years 
1 = More than four 
years 
(7) Decisions by tax of-ficers 
Regarding the tax audit process, which of the follow-
ing do you consider a serious problem in your coun-
try? 
(a) Inconsistent decisions by tax officers 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(8) Sanctions imposed in 
case of violations 
Regarding the tax audit process, which of the follow-
ing do you consider a serious problem in your coun-
try? 
(b) Ineffectiveness of sanctions imposed in case of 
violations 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(9) 
Experience or tech-
nical skill of tax of-
ficers 
Regarding the tax audit process, which of the follow-
ing do you consider a serious problem in your coun-
try? 
(c) Lack of experience or technical skill of tax offic-
ers 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(10) Behavior by tax of-ficers 
Regarding the tax audit process, which of the follow-
ing do you consider a serious problem in your coun-
try? 
(d) Offensive or unethical behavior by tax officers 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(11) Statute of limitations 
How many years after the corporate income tax re-
turn was filed does the tax authority lose the right to 
perform a tax audit and adjust the tax payable (statute 
of limitations)? 
0 = Two years or less 
0.5 = Between three 
and five years 
1 = More than five 
years 
Dimension 5: Tax appeals 
(1) Defined appeal pro-
cess 
Do rules or other written guidelines exist in your 
country that clearly outline the process of appealing 
against a decision by the tax authority? 
0 = Yes 
1 = No 
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(2) Decisions at adminis-
trative appeal level 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at administra-
tive level, which of the following do you consider a 
serious problem in your country? 
(a) Inconsistent decisions at administrative appeal 
level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(3) 
Influence of third 
parties at administra-
tive appeal level 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at administra-
tive level, which of the following do you consider a 
serious problem in your country? 
(b) Influence of third parties at administrative appeal 
level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(4) Agents/staff 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at administra-
tive level, which of the following do you consider a 
serious problem in your country? 
(c) Lack of (specialized) agents/staff at administra-
tive level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(5) 
Time period between 
the filing of an appeal 
at administrative 
level and its resolu-
tion 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at administra-
tive level, which of the following do you consider a 
serious problem in your country? 
(c) Unpredictable time period between the filing of 
an appeal at administrative level and its resolution at 
this level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(6) Decisions at judicial level 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at judicial 
level, which of the following do you consider a seri-
ous problem in your country? 
(a) Inconsistent decisions at judicial level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(7) 
Influence of third 
parties at judicial 
level 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at judicial 
level, which of the following do you consider a seri-
ous problem in your country? 
(b) Influence of third parties at judicial level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(8) Judges 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at judicial 
level, which of the following do you consider a seri-
ous problem in your country? 
(c) Lack of (specialized) judges at judicial level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(9) 
Time period between 
the filing of an appeal 
at judicial level and 
its resolution 
Regarding the treatment of tax appeals at judicial 
level, which of the following do you consider a seri-
ous problem in your country? 
(d) Unpredictable time period between the filing of 
an appeal at judicial level and its resolution at this 
level 
0 = Not selected 
1 = Selected 
(10) 
Public access to judi-
cial decisions on tax 
appeals 
Are judicial decisions on tax appeals publicly acces-
sible in your country after they are made? 
0 = Yes 
1 = No 
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Appendix 2. Tax code weighting factors 
 
Panel A: Dimensions of tax code complexity 
Dimension Weighting factor 
Additional local and industry-specific taxes 0.039 
(Alternative) minimum tax 0.025 
Capital gains and losses 0.064 
Controlled foreign corporations 0.052 
Corporate reorganization 0.068 
Depreciation and amortization 0.071 
Dividends (incl. withholding taxes) 0.081 
General anti-avoidance 0.074 
Group treatment 0.053 
Interest (incl. withholding taxes and thin cap.) 0.081 
Investment incentives 0.073 
Loss offset 0.079 
Royalties (incl. withholding taxes) 0.080 
Statutory corporate income tax rate 0.075 
Transfer pricing 0.085 
 
Panel B: Drivers of tax code complexity 
Complexity driver Weighting factor 
Ambiguity & interpretation 0.230 
Change 0.208 
Computation 0.175 
Detail 0.193 
Record keeping 0.194 
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Appendix 3. Variable descriptions 
 
Panel A: Other tax complexity variables 
Variable Description Source 
Paying Taxes 
Overall tax burden of a country. Consists of the number of tax 
payments, the time to prepare, file and pay taxes, the total tax 
and contribution rate (each measure captures corporate income, 
labor and consumption taxes), as well as the post-filing index. A 
higher score indicates a less burdensome country. 
PwC et al. (2017) 
Post-filing index 
Post-filing processes of a country’s tax system. Consists of the 
components time to comply with a VAT refund (hours), time to 
obtain a VAT refund (weeks), time to comply with a CIT audit 
(hours) and time to complete a CIT audit (weeks). A higher 
score indicates a more efficient process. 
PwC et al. (2017) 
Time to comply Time to comply with country’s corporate income, labor and 
consumption taxes (hours). PwC et al. (2017) 
Number tax payments Number of tax payments that have to be made in a country for 
corporate income, labor and consumption taxes. PwC et al. (2017) 
Time to comply CIT Time to comply with country’s corporate income taxes (hours). PwC et al. (2017) 
Number CIT pay-
ments 
Number of tax payments that have to be made in a country for 
corporate income taxes. PwC et al. (2017) 
Time to comply CIT 
audit 
Time to comply with a country’s corporate income tax audit, in-
cluding the correction of an error (hours). PwC et al. (2017) 
Time to complete 
CIT audit 
Time to complete a country’s corporate income tax audit 
(weeks). PwC et al. (2017) 
Financial Complexity 
Index 
Complexity of maintaining accounting and tax compliance. 
Consists of the areas compliance, reporting, bookkeeping and 
tax. A higher rank indicates a less complex country. 
TMF Group 
(2017, 2018) 
 
Panel B: Other country variables 
Variable Description Source 
Control of corruption 
Control of corruption for 2016. Captures perceptions of the ex-
tent to which public power is exercised for private gain, includ-
ing both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "cap-
ture" of the state by elites and private interests. Runs from ap-
proximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance. 
Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators 
Development 
Human development index for 2016. Presents a summary meas-
ure of average achievement in key dimensions of human devel-
opment: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and hav-
ing a decent standard of living. 
Human Develop-
ment Report 
Effective average tax 
rate 
Effective average tax rate for 2016. Reflects the average tax 
contribution a firm makes on an investment project earning 
above-zero economic profits. It is defined as the difference in 
the NPV of pre-tax and post-tax economic profits relative to the 
NPV of pre-tax income net of real economic depreciation. 
OECD 
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Effective marginal 
tax rate 
Effective marginal tax rate for 2016. Measures the extent to 
which taxation increases the cost of capital; it corresponds to the 
case of a marginal project that delivers just enough profit to 
break even but no economic profit over and above this thresh-
old. 
OECD 
Foreign investments 
Foreign direct investments, net inflows (current US$) for 2016. 
Consists of the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
and other capital. 
World Bank Open 
Data 
GDP (Gross Domes-
tic Product) 
Gross domestic product (constant 2010 US$) for 2016. Consists 
of the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not in-
cluded in the value of the products. 
World Bank Open 
Data 
Government effec-
tiveness 
Government effectiveness for 2016. Captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies. Runs from ap-
proximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance. 
Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators 
Inequality 
GINI index (World Bank estimate) for 2016 or most recent 
year. Measures the extent to which the distribution of income 
(or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals 
or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly 
equal distribution. A GINI index of 0 represents perfect equal-
ity, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.  
World Bank Open 
Data 
Infrastructure 
Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people) for 2016. Refers 
to the sum of active number of analog fixed telephone lines, 
voice-over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop 
(WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-channel equivalents and 
fixed public payphones. 
World Bank Open 
Data 
Political stability 
Political stability and absence of violence for 2016. Measures 
perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politi-
cally motivated violence, including terrorism. Runs from ap-
proximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance. 
Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators 
Population 
Total population for 2016. Based on the de facto definition of 
population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status 
or citizenship. The values are midyear estimates. 
World Bank Open 
Data 
Regulatory quality 
Regulatory quality for 2016. Captures perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector develop-
ment. Runs from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance. 
Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators 
Rule of law 
Rule of law for 2016. Captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of soci-
ety, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, prop-
erty rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. Runs from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators 
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Shadow economy 
The shadow economy includes all economic activities which are 
hidden from official authorities for monetary, regulatory, and 
institutional reasons. Monetary reasons include avoiding paying 
taxes and all social security contributions, regulatory reasons in-
clude avoiding governmental bureaucracy or the burden of regu-
latory framework, while institutional reasons include corruption 
law, the quality of political institutions and weak rule of law. 
The size of the shadow economy is measured as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Medina and 
Schneider (2018) 
Statutory tax rate Statutory corporate income tax rate for 2016. KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table 
Tax attractiveness  Tax Attractiveness Index for 2016. Reflects the attractiveness of 
a country's tax environment based on 20 tax factors. 
www.tax-in-
dex.org  
Tax competitiveness 
Corporate income tax competitiveness score for 2016. Measures 
the extent to which corporate income tax is neutral and competi-
tiveness. 
Tax Foundation 
Voice and accounta-
bility 
Voice and accountability for 2016. Captures perceptions on the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in se-
lecting their government as well as freedom of expression, free-
dom of association, and a free media. Runs from approximately 
-2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better govern-
ance. 
Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators 
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Appendix 4. Complexity (sub)index values and complexity levels across countries 
 
Country Tax Complexity 
Index 
Complexity lev-
els (quintiles) 
Tax code  
complexity  
Complexity lev-
els (quintiles) 
Tax framework 
complexity  
Complexity lev-
els (quintiles) 
Afghanistan 0.40 High 0.45 Medium 0.36 High 
Albania 0.50 Very high 0.51 High 0.50 Very high 
Argentina 0.36 Medium 0.43 Medium 0.29 Medium 
Armenia 0.33 Low 0.31 Very low 0.35 High 
Australia* 0.39 High 0.53 Very high 0.25 Low 
Austria* 0.34 Low 0.48 High 0.21 Very low 
Azerbaijan 0.37 Medium 0.31 Very low 0.44 Very high 
Bangladesh 0.35 Low 0.47 Medium 0.23 Very low 
Barbados 0.36 Medium 0.28 Very low 0.43 Very high 
Belarus 0.33 Low 0.34 Low 0.32 Medium 
Belgium* 0.37 Medium 0.44 Medium 0.29 Medium 
Botswana 0.34 Low 0.33 Very low 0.34 High 
Brazil 0.53 Very high 0.61 Very high 0.46 Very high 
Bulgaria 0.27 Very low 0.23 Very low 0.31 Medium 
Canada* 0.37 Medium 0.50 High 0.25 Low 
Chile* 0.42 Very high 0.58 Very high 0.26 Low 
China, People's Republic of 0.41 High 0.48 High 0.33 High 
Colombia 0.52 Very high 0.64 Very high 0.41 Very high 
Costa Rica 0.36 Medium 0.34 Low 0.38 Very high 
Croatia 0.47 Very high 0.50 High 0.44 Very high 
Cyprus 0.35 Low 0.37 Low 0.32 Medium 
Czech Republic* 0.43 Very high 0.49 High 0.38 Very high 
Denmark* 0.36 Medium 0.47 Medium 0.25 Low 
Dominican Republic 0.33 Low 0.36 Low 0.30 Medium 
Ecuador 0.42 High 0.54 Very high 0.30 Medium 
Egypt 0.51 Very high 0.57 Very high 0.45 Very high 
El Salvador 0.33 Low 0.34 Low 0.31 Medium 
Estonia* 0.22 Very low 0.18 Very low 0.26 Low 
Ethiopia 0.40 High 0.33 Very low 0.47 Very high 
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Finland* 0.34 Low 0.46 Medium 0.23 Very low 
France* 0.40 High 0.54 Very high 0.25 Low 
Germany* 0.37 Medium 0.48 High 0.26 Low 
Ghana 0.48 Very high 0.58 Very high 0.37 High 
Greece* 0.43 Very high 0.50 High 0.37 Very high 
Guatemala 0.35 Low 0.34 Low 0.36 High 
Hong Kong 0.25 Very low 0.26 Very low 0.24 Low 
Hungary* 0.35 Medium 0.37 Low 0.34 High 
India 0.39 High 0.55 Very high 0.24 Low 
Indonesia 0.48 Very high 0.56 Very high 0.40 Very high 
Ireland* 0.30 Very low 0.41 Low 0.19 Very low 
Israel* 0.28 Very low 0.36 Low 0.21 Very low 
Italy* 0.45 Very high 0.56 Very high 0.34 High 
Jamaica 0.33 Low 0.32 Very low 0.34 High 
Japan* 0.33 Low 0.48 High 0.18 Very low 
Jersey, Channel Islands 0.19 Very low 0.20 Very low 0.18 Very low 
Kazakhstan 0.42 High 0.49 High 0.35 High 
Kenya 0.40 High 0.50 High 0.30 Medium 
Korea, Republic of* 0.30 Very low 0.41 Low 0.19 Very low 
Kosovo 0.41 High 0.43 Medium 0.38 Very high 
Lao, People's Democratic Republic 0.37 Medium 0.37 Low 0.38 Very high 
Lebanon 0.42 Very high 0.48 High 0.37 High 
Liechtenstein 0.26 Very low 0.40 Low 0.12 Very low 
Lithuania 0.27 Very low 0.32 Very low 0.23 Very low 
Luxembourg* 0.27 Very low 0.34 Low 0.19 Very low 
Macedonia 0.34 Low 0.30 Very low 0.39 Very high 
Madagascar 0.37 Medium 0.42 Medium 0.32 Medium 
Malaysia 0.34 Low 0.47 Medium 0.22 Very low 
Malta 0.32 Low 0.46 Medium 0.18 Very low 
Mauritius 0.22 Very low 0.30 Very low 0.14 Very low 
Mexico* 0.42 Very high 0.51 Very high 0.32 Medium 
Mongolia 0.45 Very high 0.55 Very high 0.35 High 
Netherlands* 0.32 Low 0.49 High 0.16 Very low 
New Zealand* 0.28 Very low 0.35 Low 0.21 Very low 
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Nicaragua 0.20 Very low 0.12 Very low 0.29 Medium 
Nigeria 0.42 Very high 0.53 Very high 0.32 Medium 
Norway* 0.34 Low 0.44 Medium 0.24 Low 
Oman 0.30 Very low 0.31 Very low 0.29 Medium 
Pakistan 0.39 High 0.49 High 0.30 Medium 
Peru 0.37 Medium 0.37 Low 0.36 High 
Philippines 0.46 Very high 0.63 Very high 0.29 Medium 
Poland* 0.41 High 0.49 High 0.34 High 
Portugal* 0.37 Medium 0.49 High 0.24 Low 
Puerto Rico 0.30 Very low 0.33 Very low 0.27 Low 
Qatar 0.33 Low 0.30 Very low 0.35 High 
Romania 0.39 High 0.43 Medium 0.36 High 
Russian Federation 0.42 High 0.53 Very high 0.30 Medium 
Saudi Arabia 0.44 Very high 0.47 Medium 0.41 Very high 
Serbia 0.40 High 0.45 Medium 0.35 High 
Singapore 0.25 Very low 0.33 Very low 0.17 Very low 
Slovakia* 0.42 High 0.54 Very high 0.29 Medium 
Slovenia* 0.37 Medium 0.47 Medium 0.28 Low 
South Africa 0.39 High 0.49 High 0.28 Medium 
Spain* 0.38 Medium 0.51 Very high 0.24 Low 
Sri Lanka 0.40 High 0.45 Medium 0.36 High 
Sweden* 0.36 Medium 0.49 High 0.24 Low 
Switzerland* 0.31 Very low 0.42 Medium 0.21 Very low 
Taiwan 0.34 Low 0.41 Low 0.27 Low 
Tanzania 0.47 Very high 0.57 Very high 0.37 High 
Thailand 0.40 High 0.46 Medium 0.34 High 
Tunisia 0.30 Very low 0.34 Low 0.27 Low 
Turkey* 0.37 Medium 0.45 Medium 0.29 Medium 
Uganda 0.31 Very low 0.35 Low 0.27 Low 
Ukraine 0.40 High 0.42 Low 0.37 Very high 
United Kingdom* 0.35 Medium 0.48 High 0.23 Very low 
United States of America* 0.37 Medium 0.50 High 0.23 Low 
Uruguay 0.34 Low 0.41 Low 0.27 Low 
Venezuela 0.35 Medium 0.30 Very low 0.41 Very high 
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Vietnam 0.45 Very high 0.53 Very high 0.37 Very high 
Yemen 0.23 Very low 0.25 Very low 0.21 Very low 
Zimbabwe 0.49 Very high 0.43 Medium 0.54 Very high 
Notes: OECD countries are marked with an asterisk (*).
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Appendix 5. Descriptive statistics of the complexity drivers 
 
Panel A: Drivers of tax code complexity 
# Dimension # Complexity driver Mean Var. 
coeff. Min. Max. 
(1) 
Additional local 
and industry-spe-
cific taxes 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.30 0.56 0.00 0.71 
(2) Change 0.31 0.58 0.00 0.88 
(3) Computation 0.27 0.55 0.00 0.64 
(4) Detail 0.30 0.54 0.00 0.72 
(5) Record keeping 0.28 0.57 0.00 0.69 
(2) (Alternative) mini-
mum tax 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.17 0.92 0.00 0.57 
(2) Change 0.17 0.96 0.00 0.69 
(3) Computation 0.16 0.97 0.00 0.67 
(4) Detail 0.17 0.90 0.00 0.65 
(5) Record keeping 0.16 0.95 0.00 0.57 
(3) Capital gains and losses 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.39 0.40 0.00 0.72 
(2) Change 0.38 0.42 0.00 0.75 
(3) Computation 0.38 0.43 0.00 0.70 
(4) Detail 0.40 0.43 0.00 0.71 
(5) Record keeping 0.44 0.38 0.00 0.75 
(4) Controlled foreign 
corporations 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.38 0.54 0.00 0.75 
(2) Change 0.35 0.56 0.00 0.86 
(3) Computation 0.34 0.60 0.00 0.79 
(4) Detail 0.37 0.61 0.00 0.86 
(5) Record keeping 0.36 0.56 0.00 0.81 
(5) Corporate reorgan-ization 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.49 0.37 0.00 0.79 
(2) Change 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.75 
(3) Computation 0.44 0.39 0.00 0.79 
(4) Detail 0.48 0.41 0.00 0.84 
(5) Record keeping 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.78 
(6) Depreciation and 
amortization 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.38 0.33 0.06 0.69 
(2) Change 0.38 0.37 0.08 0.75 
(3) Computation 0.43 0.29 0.10 0.75 
(4) Detail 0.41 0.30 0.00 0.63 
(5) Record keeping 0.47 0.30 0.10 0.75 
(7) Dividends (incl. 
withholding taxes) 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.40 0.34 0.00 0.75 
(2) Change 0.43 0.32 0.08 0.71 
(3) Computation 0.39 0.30 0.08 0.71 
(4) Detail 0.44 0.31 0.13 0.71 
(5) Record keeping 0.46 0.28 0.10 0.75 
(8) General anti-
avoidance 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.54 0.33 0.00 0.85 
(2) Change 0.47 0.37 0.00 0.86 
(3) Computation 0.42 0.34 0.00 0.81 
(4) Detail 0.47 0.37 0.00 0.78 
(5) Record keeping 0.49 0.32 0.00 0.81 
(9) Group treatment 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.35 0.51 0.00 0.68 
(2) Change 0.34 0.51 0.00 0.67 
(3) Computation 0.34 0.49 0.00 0.69 
(4) Detail 0.36 0.54 0.00 0.72 
(5) Record keeping 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.70 
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(10) 
Interest (incl. with-
holding taxes and 
thin cap.) 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.45 0.34 0.06 0.88 
(2) Change 0.44 0.34 0.06 0.75 
(3) Computation 0.45 0.30 0.10 0.72 
(4) Detail 0.47 0.30 0.06 0.81 
(5) Record keeping 0.48 0.29 0.05 0.75 
(11) Investment incen-
tives 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.44 0.39 0.00 0.86 
(2) Change 0.48 0.37 0.00 0.92 
(3) Computation 0.45 0.38 0.00 0.81 
(4) Detail 0.48 0.35 0.00 0.81 
(5) Record keeping 0.50 0.35 0.00 0.81 
(12) Loss offset 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.40 0.32 0.00 0.69 
(2) Change 0.42 0.35 0.00 0.75 
(3) Computation 0.42 0.31 0.00 0.69 
(4) Detail 0.43 0.32 0.00 0.64 
(5) Record keeping 0.47 0.32 0.00 0.86 
(13) Royalties (incl. 
withholding taxes) 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.46 0.31 0.15 0.80 
(2) Change 0.43 0.32 0.08 0.83 
(3) Computation 0.41 0.29 0.08 0.69 
(4) Detail 0.45 0.26 0.15 0.68 
(5) Record keeping 0.48 0.29 0.05 0.81 
(14) Statutory corporate income tax rate 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.34 0.42 0.00 0.64 
(2) Change 0.41 0.36 0.00 0.92 
(3) Computation 0.37 0.32 0.00 0.64 
(4) Detail 0.38 0.36 0.00 0.75 
(5) Record keeping 0.40 0.38 0.00 0.75 
(15) Transfer pricing 
(1) Ambiguity & interpretation 0.63 0.29 0.00 0.90 
(2) Change 0.57 0.35 0.00 0.92 
(3) Computation 0.59 0.31 0.00 0.94 
(4) Detail 0.59 0.33 0.00 0.92 
(5) Record keeping 0.63 0.30 0.00 0.88 
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Panel B: Drivers of tax framework complexity 
# Dimension # Complexity driver Mean Var.  
coeff. Min. Max. 
(1) Tax guidance 
(1) Differences between GAAP and tax regulations 0.49 0.27 0.13 0.75 
(2) Public binding rulings 0.22 0.96 0.00 0.80 
(3) Private binding rulings 0.21 0.97 0.00 1.00 
(4) Non-binding oral or written advice 0.17 0.98 0.00 0.63 
(5) Substantial business issues/transactions 0.25 0.72 0.00 1.00 
(6) International soft law 0.51 0.24 0.25 0.85 
(2) Tax law enactment 
(1) Defined enactment process 0.03 2.15 0.00 0.33 
(2) Access to enacted tax legislation 0.11 1.36 0.00 0.67 
(3) Influence of third parties 0.27 0.82 0.00 1.00 
(4) Quality of tax legislation drafting 0.60 0.39 0.00 1.00 
(5) Time at which legislation becomes effective 0.38 0.62 0.00 1.00 
(6) Time between the announcement and enactment of tax changes 0.42 0.58 0.00 1.00 
(3) Tax filing and payments 
(1) Computing tax payments 0.25 0.86 0.00 0.75 
(2) Determining due dates for tax payments 0.04 1.91 0.00 0.40 
(3) Identifying the recipient(s) of tax payments 0.02 2.57 0.00 0.25 
(4) Managing the number of tax payments during a year 0.16 1.14 0.00 0.71 
(5) Refunding overpaid corporate income taxes 0.53 0.66 0.00 1.00 
(6) (Electronic) remittance of tax payments 0.15 1.36 0.00 0.80 
(7) Determining due dates for filing tax returns 0.05 1.73 0.00 0.50 
(8) Identifying the recipient(s) of tax returns 0.03 2.51 0.00 0.43 
(9) Managing the number of tax returns during a year 0.15 1.12 0.00 0.67 
(10) Preparing tax returns 0.35 0.73 0.00 1.00 
(11) (Electronic) transmission of tax returns 0.23 1.03 0.00 0.83 
(12) Choice of tax year 0.30 1.23 0.00 1.00 
(13) Consolidated tax returns 0.79 0.36 0.00 1.00 
(14) Instructions for filing tax returns 0.11 1.30 0.00 0.75 
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(4) Tax audits 
(1) Defined tax audit process 0.30 0.86 0.00 1.00 
(2) Tax audit cycle 0.40 0.69 0.00 1.00 
(3) Notification of the upcoming tax audit 0.25 0.98 0.00 1.00 
(4) Disclosure of selection criteria for tax audit targets 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
(5) Communication of topics to be covered by the tax audit 0.36 0.64 0.00 1.00 
(6) Number of years covered by an audit 0.44 0.47 0.00 1.00 
(7) Decisions by tax officers 0.69 0.38 0.00 1.00 
(8) Sanctions imposed in case of violations 0.15 1.10 0.00 0.67 
(9) Experience or technical skill of tax officers 0.56 0.43 0.00 1.00 
(10) Behavior by tax officers 0.32 0.83 0.00 1.00 
(11) Statute of limitations 0.74 0.30 0.00 1.00 
(5) Tax appeals 
(1) Defined appeal process 0.04 2.15 0.00 0.50 
(2) Decisions at administrative appeal level 0.37 0.65 0.00 1.00 
(3) Influence of third parties at administrative appeal level 0.09 1.62 0.00 0.75 
(4) Agents/staff 0.25 0.83 0.00 1.00 
(5) Time period between the filing of an appeal at administrative level and its resolution 0.33 0.76 0.00 1.00 
(6) Decisions at judicial level 0.32 0.82 0.00 1.00 
(7) Influence of third parties at judicial level 0.11 1.74 0.00 1.00 
(8) Judges 0.36 0.69 0.00 1.00 
(9) Time period between the filing of an appeal at judicial level and its resolution 0.53 0.45 0.00 1.00 
(10) Public access to judicial decisions on tax appeals 0.14 1.29 0.00 0.67 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469663
63 
 
Appendix 6. Descriptive statistics of country characteristics 
 
Panel A: Economic characteristics 
Characteristic n Mean Std. dev. Var. coeff. Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Ln Population 98 16.53 1.74 0.11 10.54 15.47 16.42 17.70 21.04 
Ln GDP 95 25.78 1.80 0.07 22.26 24.57 25.87 26.88 30.46 
Ln Foreign investments 90 22.26 1.94 0.09 16.16 20.88 21.98 23.56 26.90 
Development 95 0.78 0.13 0.17 0.45 0.72 0.79 0.89 0.95 
Infrastructure 97 22.89 16.64 0.73 0.08 8.55 18.74 37.53 60.27 
Inequality 87 36.40 7.40 0.20 25.00 31.60 35.70 41.00 63.00 
 
Panel B: Political/legal characteristics 
Characteristic n Mean Std. dev. Var. coeff. Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Voice and accountability 98 0.25 0.96 3.82 -1.78 -0.47 0.42 1.08 1.58 
Political stability 98 0.06 0.99 17.08 -2.79 -0.54 0.23 0.85 1.53 
Government effectiveness 98 0.46 0.92 2.02 -1.82 -0.21 0.35 1.22 2.21 
Regulatory quality 98 0.44 0.96 2.17 -2.00 -0.26 0.42 1.16 2.18 
Rule of law 98 0.36 1.00 2.74 -2.18 -0.39 0.23 1.14 2.04 
Control of corruption 98 0.28 1.06 3.75 -1.67 -0.53 0.04 1.14 2.30 
 
Panel C: Tax characteristics 
Characteristic n Mean Std. dev. Var. coeff. Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Statutory tax rate 91 0.23 0.06 0.28 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.40 
Effective average tax rate 45 0.22 0.06 0.27 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.35 
Effective marginal tax rate 45 0.14 0.07 0.50 -0.09 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.48 
Tax attractiveness 82 0.40 0.13 0.32 0.12 0.31 0.39 0.48 0.89 
Tax competitiveness 33 60.76 13.72 0.23 31.90 51.00 60.30 68.80 100.00 
Shadow economy 92 23.99 11.82 0.49 6.94 14.00 22.96 31.75 67.00 
Notes: Variables are defined in Appendix 3, panel B.
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Appendix 7. Spearman correlations between tax complexity levels and other country charac-
teristics 
 
Panel A: Economic country characteristics 
Characteristic Tax Complexity Index  level 
Tax code  
complexity level 
Tax framework  
complexity level 
Ln population 0.49 0.58 0.10 
Ln GDP 0.18 0.52 -0.28 
Ln foreign investments 0.13 0.44 -0.30 
Development -0.33 -0.02 -0.50 
Infrastructure -0.33 -0.10 -0.39 
Inequality 0.05 -0.04 0.15 
 
Panel B: Political/legal country characteristics 
Characteristic Tax Complexity Index  level 
Tax code  
complexity level 
Tax framework  
complexity level 
Voice and accountability -0.26 0.09 -0.53 
Political stability -0.42 -0.18 -0.45 
Government effectiveness -0.37 -0.03 -0.58 
Regulatory quality -0.42 -0.08 -0.59 
Rule of law -0.38 -0.04 -0.59 
Control of corruption -0.39 -0.07 -0.55 
 
Panel C: Other tax country characteristics 
Characteristic Tax Complexity Index level 
Tax code  
complexity level 
Tax framework  
complexity level 
Statutory tax rate 0.24 0.38 0.00 
Effective average tax rate 0.11 0.43 -0.13 
Effective marginal tax rate 0.10 0.32 -0.10 
Tax attractiveness -0.34 -0.21 -0.39 
Tax competitiveness -0.20 -0.39 -0.01 
Shadow economy 0.21 -0.11 0.47 
Notes: Bold numbers denote statistically significant correlations (p<0.1). Variables are de-
fined in Appendix 3, panel B.
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Appendix 8. Correlations with extreme value exclusion 
 
Panel A: Extreme value exclusion for economic characteristics 
 
 
Tax Complexity Index Tax code  
complexity 
Tax framework  
complexity 
Characteristic Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman 
Ln population 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.57 0.15 0.10 
w/o lower 10% 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.03 0.05 
w/o upper 10% 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.49 0.10 0.11 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.04 0.06 
Ln GDP 0.20 0.18 0.52 0.52 -0.31 -0.33 
w/o lower 10% 0.15 0.14 0.49 0.48 -0.34 -0.34 
w/o upper 10% 0.17 0.15 0.47 0.45 -0.30 -0.31 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.11 0.11 0.44 0.41 -0.34 -0.32 
Ln foreign investments 0.09 0.12 0.40 0.44 -0.36 -0.34 
w/o lower 10% 0.07 0.13 0.37 0.39 -0.36 -0.32 
w/o upper 10% 0.20 0.24 0.49 0.54 -0.31 -0.29 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.22 0.26 0.50 0.50 -0.31 -0.26 
Development -0.25 -0.33 0.02 -0.02 -0.45 -0.54 
w/o lower 10% -0.30 -0.33 -0.01 -0.04 -0.50 -0.58 
w/o upper 10% -0.21 -0.28 0.00 -0.03 -0.38 -0.45 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.26 -0.28 -0.03 -0.05 -0.43 -0.50 
Infrastructure -0.33 -0.35 -0.08 -0.12 -0.45 -0.42 
w/o lower 10% -0.30 -0.30 -0.02 -0.06 -0.47 -0.45 
w/o upper 10% -0.28 -0.30 -0.06 -0.11 -0.40 -0.35 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.25 -0.25 0.00 -0.04 -0.43 -0.38 
Inequality 0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.17 0.16 
w/o lower 10% 0.13 0.12 -0.04 -0.05 0.28 0.31 
w/o upper 10% -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 0.06 0.06 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.01 0.07 -0.15 -0.10 0.20 0.22 
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Panel B: Extreme value exclusion for political/legal characteristics 
 
 
Tax Complexity Index Tax code  
complexity 
Tax framework  
complexity 
Characteristic Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman 
Voice and accountability -0.22 -0.28 0.10 0.08 -0.50 -0.55 
w/o lower 10% -0.20 -0.24 0.09 0.06 -0.46 -0.52 
w/o upper 10% -0.17 -0.21 0.10 0.10 -0.44 -0.46 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.15 -0.17 0.08 0.08 -0.38 -0.41 
Political stability -0.34 -0.43 -0.15 -0.18 -0.39 -0.49 
w/o lower 10% -0.41 -0.42 -0.20 -0.19 -0.46 -0.50 
w/o upper 10% -0.23 -0.32 -0.08 -0.09 -0.29 -0.38 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.29 -0.29 -0.12 -0.10 -0.34 -0.39 
Government effectiveness -0.34 -0.38 0.01 -0.02 -0.60 -0.62 
w/o lower 10% -0.46 -0.44 -0.10 -0.12 -0.67 -0.68 
w/o upper 10% -0.26 -0.29 0.04 0.01 -0.52 -0.53 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.39 -0.35 -0.08 -0.09 -0.60 -0.60 
Regulatory quality -0.38 -0.43 -0.03 -0.07 -0.61 -0.62 
w/o lower 10% -0.43 -0.45 -0.10 -0.12 -0.64 -0.67 
w/o upper 10% -0.33 -0.38 -0.03 -0.07 -0.54 -0.53 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.39 -0.41 -0.11 -0.12 -0.57 -0.58 
Rule of law -0.36 -0.39 0.00 -0.03 -0.62 -0.63 
w/o lower 10% -0.42 -0.42 -0.07 -0.07 -0.66 -0.67 
w/o upper 10% -0.33 -0.34 -0.03 -0.05 -0.54 -0.54 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.40 -0.38 -0.11 -0.10 -0.59 -0.59 
Control of corruption -0.36 -0.39 -0.03 -0.06 -0.58 -0.59 
w/o lower 10% -0.42 -0.43 -0.09 -0.14 -0.61 -0.63 
w/o upper 10% -0.29 -0.32 -0.02 -0.03 -0.49 -0.49 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.35 -0.37 -0.09 -0.13 -0.52 -0.54 
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Panel C: Extreme value exclusion for tax characteristics 
 
 
Tax Complexity Index Tax code  
complexity 
Tax framework  
complexity 
Characteristic Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman 
Statutory tax rate 0.24 0.20 0.35 0.36 -0.01 -0.02 
w/o lower 10% 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.27 -0.03 -0.02 
w/o upper 10% 0.22 0.19 0.32 0.32 0.00 -0.01 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.14 0.10 0.21 0.22 -0.02 -0.01 
Effective average tax rate 0.16 0.07 0.35 0.39 -0.13 -0.17 
w/o lower 10% 0.03 -0.01 0.20 0.28 -0.16 -0.17 
w/o upper 10% 0.05 -0.01 0.27 0.28 -0.22 -0.23 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.14 -0.11 0.04 0.15 -0.27 -0.24 
Effective marginal tax rate -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.30 -0.12 -0.10 
w/o lower 10% -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.25 -0.10 -0.11 
w/o upper 10% 0.10 0.12 0.29 0.38 -0.11 -0.08 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.13 0.05 0.34 0.34 -0.07 -0.10 
Tax attractiveness -0.48 -0.37 -0.31 -0.24 -0.45 -0.41 
w/o lower 10% -0.46 -0.32 -0.32 -0.19 -0.41 -0.35 
w/o upper 10% -0.26 -0.20 -0.12 -0.12 -0.30 -0.28 
w/o lower and upper 10% -0.21 -0.12 -0.10 -0.05 -0.22 -0.19 
Tax competitiveness -0.30 -0.18 -0.45 -0.35 0.06 0.07 
w/o lower 10% -0.31 -0.16 -0.43 -0.27 0.02 0.03 
w/o upper 10% -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.24 0.12 0.08 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.14 0.08 0.03 
Shadow economy 0.24 0.23 -0.09 -0.09 0.54 0.53 
w/o lower 10% 0.23 0.21 -0.07 -0.07 0.51 0.49 
w/o upper 10% 0.23 0.20 -0.05 -0.04 0.45 0.48 
w/o lower and upper 10% 0.21 0.18 -0.02 -0.02 0.41 0.43 
Notes: Bold numbers denote statistically significant correlations (p<0.1). Variables are defined 
in Appendix 3, panel B. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Distribution of responses 
 
Responses  
per country 
Number of 
countries 
Countries  
(sorted by country name) 
Total 
responses 
3 13 
Afghanistan, Barbados, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Jamaica, 
Jersey, Kosovo, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, 
Liechtenstein, Tunisia, Yemen 
39 
4 13 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Estonia, Ghana, Israel, Ka-
zakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Puerto Rico, Uganda, Zimbabwe 52 
5 12 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Macedo-
nia, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Norway, Slovenia, 
Sri Lanka 
60 
6 9 Botswana, Colombia, Ecuador, Lithuania, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Ara-bia, Venezuela 48 
7 9 Chile, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Slovakia, Taiwan, Turkey, Uruguay, Vietnam 63 
8 2 Malaysia, Republic of Korea 16 
9 10 Argentina, Czech Republic, Denmark, Guatemala, Kenya, Mongo-lia, New Zealand, Portugal, Russian Federation, Thailand 90 
10 3 Finland, Serbia, Sweden 30 
11 2 Greece, Luxembourg 22 
12 5 Croatia, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, Tanzania  60 
13 2 Cyprus, Japan 26 
14 3 Brazil, Hungary, Switzerland 42 
15 1 South Africa 15 
16 1 Romania 16 
17 1 Canada 17 
18 3 France, India, Poland 54 
19 1 China 19 
21 1 Mexico 21 
22 3 Austria, Netherland, Spain 66 
23 2 Italy, Ukraine 46 
24 2 Australia, Belgium 48 
25 1 Germany 25 
27 1 United Kingdom 27 
31 1 United States of America 31 
9.33 100 Total/average 933 
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Table 2. Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
Job position Number Percentage 
Partner/Director/Principal 601 64.4% 
Manager 212 22.7% 
Senior assistant 75 8.1% 
Junior assistant 27 2.9% 
Other 18 1.9% 
Tax experience Number Percentage 
>15 years 513 55.0% 
>10 but ≤15 years 168 18.0% 
>5 but ≤10 years 147 15.7% 
≤5 years 105 11.3% 
Specialization Number Percentage 
Income taxes 799 85.6% 
Consumption taxes 64 6.9% 
Payroll taxes 19 2.0% 
Property taxes 10 1.1% 
Social security contributions 1 0.1% 
None of the above 40 4.3% 
Familiar with … other tax system(s) Number Percentage 
>three 112 12.0% 
three 64 6.8% 
two 143 15.3% 
one 178 19.1% 
no 436 46.7% 
Missing 1 0.1% 
Working time % on MNCs % on int. tax 
Mean 54.11% 40.75% 
Var. coeff. 0.51 0.63 
Missing 9 44 
Education Number Percentage 
Doctoral or equivalent 79 8.5% 
Master or equivalent 573 61.4% 
Bachelor or equivalent 253 27.1% 
Secondary education 6 0.6% 
Other 22 2.4% 
Age Number Percentage 
Over 59 years 82 8.8% 
50 – 59 years 223 23.9% 
40 – 49 years 274 29.4% 
30 – 39 years 268 28.7% 
Under 30 years 86 9.2% 
Gender Number Percentage 
Male 663 71.1% 
Female 265 28.4% 
Missing 5 0.5% 
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Table 3. Pearson/spearman correlations of the index components  
 
Panel A: Correlations between the dimensions of tax code complexity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Additional local and industry-specific taxes  0.59 0.42 0.48 0.38 0.47 0.49 0.34 0.24 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.34 0.49 0.43 
(2) (Alternative) minimum tax 0.56  0.36 0.29 0.27 0.39 0.28 0.17 0.35 0.18 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.36 0.28 
(3) Capital gains and losses 0.41 0.35  0.56 0.71 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.49 0.71 0.49 0.65 0.62 0.45 0.60 
(4) Controlled foreign corporations 0.45 0.24 0.61  0.62 0.39 0.45 0.62 0.58 0.51 0.30 0.47 0.28 0.22 0.53 
(5) Corporate reorganization 0.35 0.29 0.73 0.64  0.58 0.59 0.66 0.42 0.56 0.53 0.66 0.50 0.24 0.66 
(6) Depreciation and amortization 0.52 0.35 0.55 0.36 0.56  0.64 0.48 0.34 0.68 0.63 0.78 0.68 0.60 0.55 
(7) Dividends (incl. withholding taxes) 0.53 0.31 0.64 0.47 0.56 0.64  0.56 0.32 0.81 0.52 0.67 0.77 0.54 0.59 
(8) General anti-avoidance 0.34 0.16 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.45 0.51  0.51 0.62 0.40 0.64 0.41 0.30 0.64 
(9) Group treatment 0.27 0.27 0.49 0.58 0.47 0.35 0.35 0.52  0.36 0.33 0.49 0.21 0.28 0.37 
(10) Interest (incl. withholding taxes and thin cap.) 0.40 0.17 0.64 0.49 0.54 0.69 0.80 0.55 0.41  0.49 0.68 0.73 0.47 0.63 
(11) Investment incentives 0.42 0.34 0.49 0.30 0.57 0.66 0.53 0.31 0.38 0.54  0.60 0.50 0.51 0.42 
(12) Loss offset 0.43 0.25 0.54 0.42 0.59 0.79 0.66 0.56 0.46 0.71 0.60  0.62 0.53 0.50 
(13) Royalties (incl. withholding taxes) 0.33 0.27 0.61 0.32 0.51 0.70 0.74 0.41 0.23 0.75 0.53 0.63  0.54 0.53 
(14) Statutory corporate income tax rate 0.51 0.34 0.41 0.24 0.22 0.63 0.61 0.31 0.31 0.54 0.47 0.58 0.57  0.31 
(15) Transfer pricing 0.40 0.28 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.44 0.45 0.67 0.34 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.46 0.22  
 
Panel B: Correlations between the dimensions of tax framework complexity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Tax guidance  0.23 0.34 0.35 0.39 
(2) Tax law enactment 0.24  0.46 0.55 0.53 
(3) Tax filing and payments 0.25 0.51  0.67 0.52 
(4) Tax audits 0.32 0.56 0.67  0.61 
(5) Tax appeals 0.45 0.51 0.47 0.57  
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Panel C: Correlations between the subindices 
  (1) (2) 
(1) Tax code complexity subindex  0.12 
(2) Tax framework complexity subindex 0.14  
Notes: Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the lower triangle, while Spearman's rank correlations are shown above the diagonal. Bold 
numbers denote statistically significant correlations (p<0.1). 
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Table 4. Pearson/spearman correlations external validation 
 
 Number 
of obs. 
Tax Complexity  
Index 
Tax code  
complexity subindex 
Tax framework  
complexity subindex 
Filing and payments  
dimension 
Audits  
dimension 
Paying Taxes 98 -0.46 
-0.43 
0.02 
-0.07 
-0.71 
-0.77 
-0.77 
-0.82 
-0.64 
-0.71 
Post-filing index 98 -0.37 
-0.33 
0.07 
0.05 
-0.62 
-0.61 
-0.77 
-0.73 
-0.56 
-0.59 
Time to comply 97 0.49 0.47 
0.22 
0.09 
0.53 
0.80 
0.68 
0.79 
0.49 
0.73 
Number tax payments 97 0.22 0.14 
-0.16 
-0.07 
0.49 
0.36 
0.28 
0.21 
0.44 
0.35 
Financial Complexity 
Index 2017 75 
-0.54 
-0.41 
-0.18 
-0.27 
-0.63 
-0.62 
-0.60 
-0.62 
-0.56 
-0.51 
Financial Complexity 
Index 2018 75 
-0.60 
-0.58 
-0.19 
-0.33 
-0.72 
-0.71 
-0.76 
-0.80 
-0.54 
-0.45 
Notes: Pearson's correlation coefficients are shown in the upper part of each cell, while Spearman's rank correlations are shown in 
the lower part of each cell. Bold numbers denote statistically significant correlations (p<0.1). Variables are defined in Appendix 3, 
panel A.
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics on the Tax Complexity Index and subindices 
 
(Sub)index Mean Std. dev. Var. coeff. Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Tax Complexity Index 0.37 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.33 0.37 0.41 0.53 
Tax code complexity subindex 0.43 0.10 0.24 0.12 0.34 0.45 0.50 0.64 
Tax framework complexity subindex 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.24 0.30 0.36 0.54 
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Table 6. Tax Complexity Index and subindices – OECD vs. non-OECD countries 
 
 
All countries 
(n = 100) 
OECD countries 
(n = 33) 
Non-OECD countries 
(n = 67) Difference test (p-value) 
(Sub)index Mean Var. coeff. Mean Var. coeff. Mean Var. coeff. t-test Rank-sum 
Tax Complexity Index 0.37 0.19 0.36 0.15 0.37 0.21 0.40 0.45 
Tax code complexity subindex 0.43 0.24 0.46 0.17 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.02 
Tax framework complexity subindex 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.00 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics on the dimensions of tax code and tax framework complexity 
 
Panel A: Tax code complexity 
Dimension Mean Std. dev. Var. coeff. Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Additional local and industry-specific taxes 0.29 0.15 0.53 0.00 0.18 0.31 0.40 0.67 
(Alternative) minimum tax 0.17 0.15 0.90 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.59 
Capital gains and losses 0.40 0.15 0.37 0.00 0.33 0.41 0.50 0.67 
Controlled foreign corporations 0.36 0.20 0.55 0.00 0.20 0.36 0.52 0.80 
Corporate reorganization 0.46 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.39 0.50 0.59 0.75 
Depreciation and amortization 0.41 0.11 0.26 0.09 0.35 0.42 0.49 0.67 
Dividends (incl. withholding taxes) 0.42 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.35 0.43 0.50 0.69 
General anti-avoidance 0.48 0.15 0.30 0.00 0.38 0.50 0.59 0.77 
Group treatment 0.35 0.17 0.48 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.49 0.66 
Interest (incl. withholding taxes and thin cap.) 0.46 0.12 0.27 0.07 0.38 0.47 0.54 0.70 
Investment incentives 0.47 0.16 0.34 0.00 0.40 0.47 0.58 0.79 
Loss offset 0.42 0.12 0.27 0.00 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.67 
Royalties (incl. withholding taxes) 0.45 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.36 0.45 0.53 0.67 
Statutory corporate income tax rate 0.38 0.12 0.32 0.01 0.31 0.37 0.44 0.68 
Transfer pricing 0.60 0.17 0.29 0.00 0.55 0.65 0.71 0.86 
 
Panel B: Tax framework complexity 
Dimension Mean Std. dev. Var. coeff. Min. 25% 50% 75% Max. 
Tax guidance 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.57 
Tax law enactment 0.30 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.22 0.30 0.38 0.58 
Tax filing and payments 0.23 0.09 0.42 0.02 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.52 
Tax audits 0.43 0.13 0.31 0.15 0.32 0.43 0.52 0.85 
Tax appeals 0.25 0.11 0.44 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.32 0.65 
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Table 8. Correlations between the tax complexity indices and other country characteristics 
 
Panel A: Economic country characteristics 
 Tax Complexity Index Tax code  
complexity 
Tax framework  
complexity 
Characteristic Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman 
Ln Population 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.57 0.15 0.10 
Ln GDP 0.20 0.18 0.52 0.52 -0.31 -0.33 
Ln Foreign investments 0.09 0.12 0.40 0.44 -0.36 -0.34 
Development -0.25 -0.33 0.02 -0.02 -0.45 -0.54 
Infrastructure -0.33 -0.35 -0.08 -0.12 -0.45 -0.42 
Inequality 0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.17 0.16 
 
Panel B: Political/legal country characteristics 
 
 
Tax Complexity Index Tax code  
complexity 
Tax framework  
complexity 
Characteristic Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman Pearson  Spearman 
Voice and accountability -0.22 -0.28 0.10 0.08 -0.50 -0.55 
Political stability -0.34 -0.43 -0.15 -0.18 -0.39 -0.49 
Government effectiveness -0.34 -0.38 0.01 -0.02 -0.60 -0.62 
Regulatory quality -0.38 -0.43 -0.03 -0.07 -0.61 -0.62 
Rule of law -0.36 -0.39 0.00 -0.03 -0.62 -0.63 
Control of corruption -0.36 -0.39 -0.03 -0.06 -0.58 -0.59 
 
Panel C: Other tax system characteristics 
 
 
Tax Complexity Index Tax code  
complexity 
Tax framework  
complexity 
Characteristic Pearson  Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Statutory tax rate 0.24 0.20 0.35 0.36 -0.01 -0.02 
Effective average tax rate 0.16 0.07 0.35 0.39 -0.13 -0.17 
Effective marginal tax rate -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.30 -0.12 -0.10 
Tax attractiveness -0.48 -0.37 -0.31 -0.24 -0.45 -0.41 
Tax competitiveness  -0.30 -0.18 -0.45 -0.35 0.06 0.08 
Shadow economy 0.24 0.23 -0.09 -0.09 0.54 0.53 
Notes: Bold numbers denote statistically significant correlations (p<0.1). Variables are de-
fined in Appendix 3, panel B.
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Concept of tax complexity 
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Figure 2. Scatter plot of tax code subindex against tax framework subindex 
 
Notes: All countries are listed with their tax code and tax framework complexity subindices 
in Appendix 4. 
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